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AN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF TAX
POLICY IN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION,
2001-2004
WILLIAM G. GALE* & PETER R. ORSZAG**
Abstract: This Article analyzes the economic effects of the George W.
Bush administration's tax policies. It describes the 2001, 2002, and 2003
tax cuts and the proposals to make them permanent, and then explores
the consequences of making the tax cuts permanent on the fiscal status
of the government, the distribution of after-tax income, long-term
economic growth, and the prospects for fundamental tax reform. This
article also examines the role of the tax cuts as a short-term stimulus
over the past few years.
INTRODUCTION
Tax policy has played a central role in the George W. Bush ad-
ministration (the "Bush administration"). Three noteworthy pieces of
tax legislation have been enacted during the Bush administration's
tenure: The 2001 tax cut phased in significant reductions in income
tax rates, reduced and provided for the eventual repeal of the estate
tax, and provided additional tax breaks for saving, education, families
with children, and married couples.' Legislation in 2002 significantly
reduced the tax burden on new business investments. The 2003 tax
cut substantially reduced the taxation of dividends and capital gains,
and accelerated the phase-ins of the 2001 tax cuts.
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Under current law, all of these tax cuts are temporary, however,
and the different provisions expire at various points before the end of
2010. The Bush administration has proposed making most of the
2001 and 2003 tax cuts permanent as well as substantially expanding
tax-preferred saving accounts. Outside of the legislative arena, the
Bush administration has promulgated regulations that make it easier
for firms to deduct investment costs immediately. Taken together,
these policies and proposals represent a major shift in the structure of
American tax policy.
This Article summarizes and analyzes these policies and propos-
als. It focuses on how the tax cuts affect the fiscal status of the gov-
ernrnent, the distribution of income and taxes, the size of the econ-
omy, and the structure of the tax system. It also considers the role of
the tax cuts in providing a short-term stimulus to the economy over
the past few years.
Part I provides background information. 2 The Part describes the
enacted tax cuts and addresses three issues that are germane to any
discussion of their potential long-term effects. These issues include
specifying which provisions of the tax acts might be made permanent,
clarifying interactions between the tax cuts and the alternative mini-
mum tax, and determining how the tax cuts will be financed.
Part II discusses tax policy in the context of overall fiscal policy. 3
This Part shows that making the tax cuts permanent would require
sizable reductions in spending or increases in other taxes. In the long
term, the tax cuts would cost significantly more than fixing the entire
Social Security shortfall. As a result, making the tax cuts permanent
would represent significant deterioration in an already difficult long-
term fiscal situation. One potential counter-argument is that the tax
cuts will induce spending cuts. We find this claim to be theoretically
fragile and empirically inconsistent with most of the evidence from
the last twenty years.
Part III examines the distributional effects of the tax cuts. 4 This
Part shows that making the tax cuts permanent would be regressive
and would increase the disparity in after-tax income between high-
and low-income households. Our analysis also highlights the impor-
tance of considering the financing of tax cuts in the distributional
analysis. We show that distributional analyses that ignore the budget
2 See infra notes 8-22 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 23-78 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 79-91 and accompanying text.
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constraint can give a variety of apparently contradictory implications
about whether a tax cut is progressive or regressive. But when the
budget constraint is explicitly included in the distributional analysis,
all of the measures point in the same direction and show that the tax
cuts are regressive.
Part IV explores the impact of the tax cuts on the long-term size
of the economy.° The tax cuts affect the economy through two broad
channels. First, reductions in marginal tax rates can raise labor supply,
saving, and investment. Second, the deficits created reduce national
saving and hence reduce future capital income for Americans. The
net effect of the tax cuts on growth is the sum of the generally positive
impact of lower marginal tax rates and the negative effect of higher
budget deficits. Most studies find that the net effect of the tax cuts on
growth will be zero or negative in the long run, unless the tax cuts are
financed entirely by spending cuts.
Part V examines the role of the tax cuts as a short-term stimulus.°
The tax cuts were well-timed to provide a short-term stimulus, but were
poorly designed in other ways for this purpose. The tax cuts provided a
positive stimulus, but in a sluggish economy; almost any fiscal boost
would have done the same. The tax cuts were regressive; they phased in
slowly over time. Many of the provisions aimed to raise saving rather
than consumption, and the methods used to raise consumption were
unduly inefficient and expensive. An alternative program that was fo-
cused on progressive tax cuts, aimed at boosting consumption, and
phased in quickly could have been significantly more cost-effective in
spurring the economy in the short term.
Part VI discusses the Bush administration's policies from the view-
point of tax reform.? Although the Bush administration's proposals
share many features of consumption tax proposals, the recent pro-
posals fall short of a systematic consumption tax in both their rules
and their effects. A key element of tax reform, if capital income is to
be exempted from tax, is to eliminate deductions for interest pay-
ments, which the Bush administration has not proposed. In addition,
while a well-designed consumption tax holds out the promise of
higher national saving and stronger economic growth, the tax cuts
will have the opposite effect. Finally, the recent tax cuts may have
made it more difficult to achieve fundamental tax reform politically.
5 See infra notes 92-154 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 155-198 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 199-221 and accompanying text.
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I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
A. The Legislated Tax Cuts
The 2001, 2002, and 2003 tax cuts contain a host of tax provisions
that phase in at different rates and expire at different times. In Tables
la through ld, we divide the major enacted policies into four broad
categories: general income and estate tax cuts, tax cuts for families
and married couples, tax cuts for saving and investment, and tax cuts
for education.9
Table la shows the general income and estate tax cuts. Under the
2001 tax cut, the highest income tax rates ultimately decline by differ-
ent amounts. The top rate declines from 39.6% in 2000 to an eventual
level of 35%. The 28%, 31%, and 36% rates ultimately fall by 3 per-
centage points. These reductions were scheduled to be gradual under
the 2001 Act: all four rates were reduced by 0.5 percentage points on
July 1, 2001, and January 1, 2002, and were scheduled to be reduced
by an additional percentage point at the beginning of 2004. At the
beginning of 2006, the top rate was scheduled to fall by 2.6 percent-
age points, while the next three rates were scheduled to fall by 1 per-
centage point. The 2003 tax cut accelerated the reductions scheduled
for 2004 and 2006 to the beginning of 2003. The reduced rates are in
effect through 2010.
The 2001 Act also created a new 10% tax bracket, carved out of
the 15% bracket. The maximum taxable income level at which the
15% bracket ends did not change for singles, but was raised for joint
filers as part of the marriage penalty relief provisions. Under the 2001
Act, the 10% bracket applied to the first $12,000 of taxable income
for married couples ($6000 for singles and $10,000 for heads of
households) through 2007.9 The limit was scheduled to rise to
a For more details, see generally JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATED BUDGET EF-
FECTS OF THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR H.R. 2: THE "JOBS AND GROWTH TAX RELIEF
RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2003": FISCAL YEARS 2003-2013 (JCX-55-03) (Comm. Print 2003)
ihereinafterfoINT Comm. ON TAXATION, ES'FIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE CONFERENCE
AcitErmErrr FOR H.R. 21, available at illIp://WWW.hOUSe.gOV/jCl/X-55-03.pdf; JOINT COMM.
ON TAXATION, ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF THE "JOB CREATION AND WORKER ASSIS-
TANCE ACT or 2002": FISCAL YEARS 2002-2012 (JCX-13-02) (Comm. Print 2002), available
at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-13-02.pdf;  JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, I07'Ffi CONG., Es-
TIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR H.R. 1836: FISCAL YEARS
2001-2011 (JCX-51-01) (Comm. Print 2001), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-51-
01.pdf.
9 In 2001, the 10% bracket was implemented by providing taxpayers with a one-time
payment—the "rebate"—of the minimum of the taxpayer's year 2000 income tax liability
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$14,000 in 2008 and to be indexed for inflation starting in 2009. The
2003 Act raised the taxable income limit to $14,000 in 2003 and
$14,300 in 2004, at which point it reverts to $1 2,000 in 2005.
The 2003 tax cut reduced tax rates on dividends and capital
gains. Tax rates on realized capital gains received by individual share-
holders were reduced from 10% (in brackets in which the ordinary
income tax rate was 15% or below) and 20% (in brackets in which the
ordinary income tax was higher than 15%) to 5% and 15% through
2007 and to zero and 15% in 2008. Tax rates on dividends received by
individual shareholders were reduced from the rates that apply to or-
dinary income to the rates that apply to capital gains.
The 2001 Act raised the alternative minimum tax (the "AMT")
exemption by $2000 for single taxpayers and $4000 for married tax-
payers through 2004. The 2003 Act raised the exemptions by another
$9000 for married couples and $4500 for singles, but again only
through 2004. 10
The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001
(the "EGTRRA") repealed the limitations on itemized deductions and
phase-outs of personal exemptions. The repeal is phased in between
2005 and 2009.
EGTRRA gradually reduces and eventually repeals the estate tax
and the generation-skipping transfer tax and modifies the gift tax.
Under previous law, the effective exemption (that is, the amount of
wealth excluded due to the unified credit) for estates and gifts would
have been $700,000 in 2002, rising gradually to $1 million in 2006.
Under EGTRRA, the effective exemption for estates rose to $1 million
in 2002, and will rise to $2 million by 2006 and $3.5 million in 2009.
or $600 for married couples ($300 for singles and $500 for heads of households). 'taxpay-
ers who in 2000 had low income or other circumstances such that the payment they re-
ceived was less than what they should have received based on 2001 income were eligible to
claim the difference when they filed their income taxes for 2001. Taxpayers whose pay-
ment exceeded the amount to which they were entitled based on 2001 income were not
required to pay back the difference. The payment thus acted as an advance credit for
2001 taxes for the first group and a combination of an advance credit for 2001 taxes and a
rebate of 2000 taxes for the second group. See generally GREGG ESENWEIN & STEVEN
MAGUIRE, CONG. RF.SRARGH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONG., THE RATE REDUCTION TAX CREDIT
(11IE '`TAX REBATE") IN Pl. 107-16 (2001). Beginning in 2002, the new bracket was incor-
porated in withholding and tax tables.
10 Although not shown in Table la, EGTRRA also stipulated that the child credit and
the earned income tax credit would not be reduced by the alternative minimum tax (the
"AMT"). The 2002 tax cut allows an individual to offset the entire regular tax liability and
AMT liability with nonrefundable credits. This provision only extended through the end of
2003, but it was expected to be extended in 2004.
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The effective exemption for gifts remains at $1 million. The top effec-
tive marginal tax rates on estates and gifts fell from 60% under previ-
ous law to 50% in 2002 and then gradually falls to 45% in 2009. In
2010, the estate and generation-skipping transfer taxes are to be re-
pealed; the gift tax will have a $1 million lifetime gift exclusion; the
highest gift tax _rate will be set equal to the top individual income tax
rate; and the step-up in basis for capital gains on inherited assets will
be repealed and replaced with a general basis carryover provision that
has a $1.3 million exemption per decedent and an additional $3 mil-
lion exemption on inter-spousal transfers.
Table lb shows the tax cuts aimed at families and married cou-
ples. The 2001 Act gradually increases the child credit from its maxi-
mum value of $500 in 2000 to $600 in 2001 through 2004, $700 in
2005 through 2008, $800 in 2009, and $1000 in 2010. The credit was
made refundable to the extent of 10% of a taxpayer's earned income
above $10,000 for 2001 through 2004 and 15% subsequently. The
earnings threshold (but not the credit amount) is indexed for infla-
tion starting in 2002. The credit will no longer be limited by the AMT
The 2003 tax cut raised the credit to $1000 in 2003 and 2004 only.
EGTRRA addressed marriage penalties in several ways. In 2000,
the standard deduction for married couples was 167% of the standard
deductions for singles. EGTRRA raises that ratio to 174% in 2005 and
then gradually increases it to 200% by 2009. The Job Relief and Rec-
onciliation Act of 2003 (the "JGTRRA") accelerated these changes,
raising the ratio to 200% in 2003 and 2004 only.
EGTRRA also raised the ratio of the maximum taxable income
level in the 15% bracket for married couples relative to singles. Under
pre-EGTRRA law, the ratio was 167%. Under EGTRRA, the ratio would
rise to 180% in 2005 and then rise gradually to 200% in 2008. JGTRRA
raises the ratio to 200% in 2003 and 2004 only.
EGTRRA raised the beginning and ending income levels of the
earned income tax credit phase-out. These levels increase in three
steps, by a total of $3000 by 2008, after which they are indexed for in-
flation.
The 2001 tax cut expanded the child and dependent care credit,
raising the cap on expenses to $3000 per child (from $2400) and rais-
ing the credit rate to 35% (from 30%). The credit remains nonrefund-
able, though. The provision expires in 2010.
Table lc reports tax cuts for saving and investment. EGTRRA in-
cluded a series of important changes to the pension and Individual
Retirement Account ("IRA") laws and made the tax treatment of re-
tirement saving significantly more generous. Contribution limits for
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IRAs and Roth IRAs will rise gradually to $5000 by 2008 from $2000
under previous law and will be indexed for inflation thereafter. Con-
tribution limits to 401(k)s and related plans will rise gradually to
$15,000 by 2006 from $10,500 under current law, and then they will
be indexed for inflation. Additional so-called "catch-up" contributions
of up to $5000 per year for anyone over the age of fifty will be permit-
ted. Roth 401(k) plans can be established starting in 2006. The "sav-
ers' credit," a non-refundable credit that provides matching contribu-
tions to IRAs and 401(k) plans for low- and moderate-income
households, will be available between 2002 and 2006.
The 2002 tax cut provides for so-called "bonus depreciation"—a
first-year deduction of 30% of the adjusted basis of qualified invest-
ments made after September 10, 2001, and before September 11,
2004. The 2003 tax cut increased the bonus depreciation deduction
to 50% and extended the expiration date to January 1, 2005. Under
the 2003 tax cut, the maximum dollar amount that may be expensed
by small businesses increased to $100,000 (from $24,000) for invest-
ments placed in service in taxable years through 2005.
Table 1d shows education provisions. The 2001 Act expands the
definition of qualified tuition plans to include prepaid tuition ("sec-
tion 529") plans and allows an exclusion from gross income for distri-
butions from such plans (regardless of whether they are prepaid tui-
tion or savings account versions of a section 529 plan) to the extent
that the distributions are used for higher education expenses. EG-
TRRA allows taxpayers filing jointly with income below $130,000 to
take an above-the-line deduction for higher education expenses up to
$3000 in 2002 through 2003 and $4000 in 2004 through 2005. Tax-
payers filing jointly with income between $130,000 and $160,000 may
take a deduction for up to $2500 in 2004 and 2005. Effective in 2002,
the contribution limit on education IRAs rose to $2000 from $500,
the income phase-out range rose, and the definition of qualified ex-
penses expanded to include elementary and secondary school. De-
ductions for student loans were made more generous.
B. Unfinished Business
A complete examination of the long-term effects of the Bush
administration's tax policies requires specification of more than just
the actual provisions of recent legislation. All of the legislated tax pro-
visions expire before the end of 2010, so some treatment of the expir-
ing provisions must be established. The tax cuts create significant in-
teractions with the AMT that are widely regarded as unsustainable but
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that influence the revenue, distributional, and other effects of the tax
cut. And the enacted pieces of legislation contain no apparent means
of paying for the tax cuts. Although these issues at first may seem like
diversions, their resolution is absolutely central to any evaluation of
tax policy over the last four years. For each of these issues, we provide
background information and describe the assumptions that we em-
ploy in subsequent analysis.
1. Sunsets
The most novel aspect of the recent tax cuts is that they all expire
or "sunset" by the end of 2010. At that point, under current law, all
provisions of the tax cuts that have not already phased out are re-
pealed, and the tax code reverts to what it would have been had the
tax bills never been enacted.
The sunset provisions complicate analysis of the tax cuts. Virtually
no one believes the tax cuts will sunset in their entirety as written.
Other temporary tax provisions are typically extended at their sched-
uled expiration date, and the Bush administration has continually in-
dicated the expectation and desire that the tax cuts be made "perma-
nent?" But exactly when or which parts of the bill might be extended
is unclear.
For most purposes, we analyze the tax cuts as if they were made
permanent as proposed in the Bush administration's fiscal year 2005
budget." As described in the last column of Tables la through ld, the
Bush administration has proposed making permanent almost all of
the features of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, with a few notable excep-
tions, including the savers' credit, the AMT exemption, and the edu-
cation deduction. The Bush administration's proposal does not ex-
tend or make permanent the bonus depreciation provisions enacted
in 2002 and expanded in 2003.
II Even before the 2001 tax cut was signed by President Bush, Treasury Secretary Paul
O'Neill indicated that these things are going to become permanent. They'll all be
fixed." Tax-Cut Gimmicks Portend Return to Deficit Spending, USA TODAY, June 6, 2001, at 14A.
Every Administration budget submitted after the 2001 tax cut has called for making the
tax cuts permanent.
12 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL
YEAR 2005 (2004), available at http://wwwwhitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/budget.
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2. The Alternative Minimum Tax's
The individual AMT creates an additional set of complicating
factors. Designed in the late 1960s and strengthened in 1986 to curb
aggressive tax avoidance, the AMT operates parallel to the regular
income tax system, imposing different income definitions, allowable
deductions, and rates. Taxpayers pay the AMT when their AMT liabil-
ity exceeds their regular income tax liability."
The AMT is destined to grow rapidly under current law for two
reasons. The first reason is that the AMT is not indexed for in-
flation, a problem that pre-dates EGTRRA. Under pre-EGTRRA
law, the number of AMT taxpayers would have risen from 1.6 million
in 2001 to 12.2 million in 2010 and 20.7 million in 2014 (Figure 1).
The recent tax cuts are the second source of AMT growth. By re-
ducing regular income taxes but providing only temporary AMT ad-
justments, EGTRRA and JGTRRA (if they are made permanent.) will
increase the number of AMT taxpayers to 29.5 million by 2010 and
39.8 million in 2014 (Figure 1). Among taxpayers with adjusted gross
income ("AGI") between $75,000 and $100,000, 73% will face the
AMT in 2010 if the tax cuts are made permanent, as opposed to 27%
under pre-EGTRRA law. For taxpayers with AGI between $100,000
and $200,000, the corresponding figures are 92% and 32%, respec-
tively. Thus, the recent tax cuts not only failed to stem the growth of
the AMT, but also significantly increased projected AMT growth.
The spread of the AMT will create significant problems for taxpay-
ers and policymakers. The AMT is unduly complicated, raises marginal
tax rates for many taxpayers, contains severe marriage and child penal-
ties, and is poorly targeted. Most taxpayers who face the AMT do so be-
cause of personal exemptions and deductions for state and local taxes,
not because of aggressive tax sheltering. For all of these reasons, the
expansion of the AMT will raise complexity, and reduce efficiency, eq-
uity, and transparency in the tax system.
In addition, if ignored, the AMT will end up "taking back" a sig-
nificant portion of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts. As shown in Table 1, by
2014, the AMT will take back 36% of the tax cuts associated with mak-
1 For details on the AMT, see generally Leonard E. Burman, et al., The Alvin Projections
and Problems, 100 TAX NOTES 105 (2003); Leonard Burman et al., The Individual Alternative
Minimum Tax: Problems and Potential Solutions, 55 NAr'L. TAX J. 555 (2002); or Leonard E.
Burman, et al., The Expanding Reach of the Individual Alternative Minimum 7hx, 17 J. ECON.
PERSP., Spring 2003, at 173.
14 In other cases, taxpayers pay regular income tax, but have their use of credits lim-
ited due to the AMT. We will refer to both groups as on the AMT."
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ing the tax cuts permanent, including about two-thirds of the benefits
for households with income between $100,000 and $500,000 and al-
most 40% for households with income between $75,000 and $100,000.
For all of these reasons, no one seriously expects that Congress
and the Bush administration will allow the AMT to expand as pro-
jected. But some assumption about the AMT is required for our analy-
sis because the recent tax cuts are the cause of a significant part of the
projected AMT growth and the associated problems.
Evolution of the AMT according to current law, together with the
Bush administration's proposal to make (the rest of) the tax cuts
permanent, would artificially reduce the reported budget cost of the
tax cuts relative to the true costs. The budget costs would be held
down because many taxpayers would get little or no tax cut because of
the AMT. The true costs would be larger because part of the ex-
panded AMT problem would be due to the tax cuts.
Instead, we typically assume that the AMT exemption will be in-
creased above current-law levels in each future year by enough to
keep the number of AMT taxpayers the same as it would have been
under pre-EGTRRA law in that year (as shown in Figure 1). 15 That is,
we raise the AMT exemption to offset the increase in AMT taxpayers
due to the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, but we do not "fix" the underlying
problem that the AMT is not indexed for inflation. We note the ef-
fects of alternative AMT assumptions at various points below.
3. Paying for the Tax Cuts
Tax cuts are not free. The government's budget constraint im-
plies that tax cuts must eventually be financed with increases in other
taxes or reductions in government programs. To date, the required
payments for the tax cuts enacted in 2001 and 2003 have been de-
ferred, and the tax cuts have been funded with increased borrowing.
This postpones but does not eliminate the required payments.
Some tax cut supporters argue that the payments can be post-
poned indefinitely. It is true that in a stable long-term economy, gov-
15 Under current law, the AMT exemption is $45,000 for married couples ($33,750 for
singles) starting in 2005 and is not indexed for inflation. Under our adjustment, the
analogous exemption level is $53,250 for married couples ($37,825 for singles) in 2005,
and rises gradually to $54,000 for married couples ($38,250 for singles) in 2010 and
$55,500 for married couples ($39,000 for singles) in 2014. As noted below, in estimating
the adjusted cost of the tax cuts, we assume the AMT had been reformed in the baseline.
The result is very similar to maintaining the number of AMT taxpayers at the pre-2001 law
projected levels.
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eminent debt can safely grow as fast as the economy. Thus, if govern-
ment debt were slated to grow more slowly than the economy, then
raising the growth rate of debt (for example, by cutting taxes) so it
were equal to the growth rate of the economy would be possible and
sustainable. Under such a scenario, or under a scenario of expected
permanent surpluses, no explicit increase in taxes or cut in spending
would be required.
These scenarios outline an interesting theoretical case, but they
are simply not relevant to the U.S. economy." As discussed in Part H,
under current policies, every plausible scenario shows the ratio of
federal debt to Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") exploding over time
in the absence of other policy changes, even if the tax cuts were not
made permanent." The Bush administration itself acknowledges that
under its own policies, over the long-run "the budget is on an unsus-
tamable path."18 Other evidence shows that the nation already faced
an unsustainable fiscal position even before the tax cuts were enacted,
due to the aging of the population and rising healthcare expendi-
tures." As a result, postponement of payment for the tax cuts cannot
go on forever.
A different claim is that offsetting tax increases or spending cuts
are not required because tax cuts can "'pay for themselves" by raising
economic growth and reducing tax avoidance and tax evasion."' As
discussed in Part IV, however, there is no credible evidence to support
this view in the context of making recent tax cuts permanent." In
16 Furthermore, even in the empirically irrelevant case in which government debt was
not projected to grow more quickly than the economy, the tax cuts would not be free. In
that theoretical case, no explicit increase in taxes or cut in spending would be required,
but the resources used for the tax cuts otherwise could have been used for other purposes.
There would still be a trade-off between tax cuts and other policy options.
17 See infra notes 23-78 and accompanying text.
16 OFFICE OF MGMT. & Bunorr, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, Bunorr OF '11/E UNITED
STATF:s GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2004, at 40 (2003), available at http://1,vww.whitehouse.
gov/omb/budget/fy2004/pdf/spec.pdf.
16 See generall) CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE LONC.-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK (2001); Mani.
Auerbach & William G. Gale, Tax Cuts and the Bridget, 90 TAX Nons 1869 (2001).
2° House of Representatives Budget Committee Chairman Jim Nussle made this claim
in March of 2004, echoing earlier statements by President Bush and Vice President Rich-
ard B. Cheney. Chairman Jim Nussle's quote was reported in the Daily Tax Report, See Bud
Newman 8c Nancy Ognanovich, Nussle's New Budget Enforcement Bill to Apply to Spending. Not
to Tax Cuts, 51 DAILY TAX REP. (RNA), at G-12 (Mar. 17, 2004) (quoting Rep. James A.
"Jim" Nussle). For an examination of previous Administration statements, see generally
RICHARD KOGAN, Cm. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, WILL THE TAX CUTS UIMMATELY
PAY FOR THEMSELVES? (Mar. 3, 2003), available at http://www.cbpp.org/3-3-03tax.pdf.
21 See infra notes 92-154 and accompanying text.
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fact, evidence indicates that if the recent tax cuts are financed on a
sustained basis with deficits, the net effect will be to reduce long-term
growth as shown below.22
In short, if they are made permanent, the tax cuts will have to be
paid for with either reduced future spending or increased future
taxes, relative to what would have occurred in the absence of the tax
cuts. That simple fact fundamentally alters analysis of the growth and
distributional effects of tax policy. We examine the effects of a variety
of financing assumptions below.
IL TAX CUTS AND FISCAL POLICY
Given the ubiquitous trade-offs between taxes and other uses of
public funds, placing recent tax policies in the context of the overall
fedeial budget outlook is an appropriate place to begin the analysis.
In this Part, we provide alternative perspectives on the magnitude of
the tax cuts and the financial status of the federal government, and
use these findings to evaluate several potential justifications for the
tax cuts. We also evaluate the so-called "starve the beast" theory, which
suggests that the tax cuts will induce spending cuts of equal magni-
tude and so will, on net, impose no fiscal harm.
A. Size of the Tax Cuts
Because the tax cuts phase in slowly and then expire, a key issue
in measuring and assessing the size of the tax cut is the time horizon
employed. We use two horizons. First, many budget analyses, includ-
ing the Congressional Budget Office's (the "CBO") annual projec-
tions, and revenue estimates by the Joint Committee on Taxation (the
"JCT"), the CBO, and the Department of Treasury, employ a ten-year
budget window. That window extended to 2011 at the time of the
2001 tax cuts and extended to 2014 as of January 2004. Second, for
many issues, valuable perspectives can be obtained by looking at
much longer horizons.
1. Within the Ten-Year Budget Window
Table 3 reports official estimates of the revenue loss from the tax
cuts, as estimated by the JCT. The tax cuts will reduce revenue by $1.75
trillion, or 1.2% of GDP, between fiscal years 2001 and 2011. The 2001
22 See infra notes 92-154 and accompanying text.
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tax legislation accounts for slightly more than three-quarters of this
revenue loss, the 2003 tax legislation accounts for about one-fifth, and
the remainder is due to the 2002 tax legislation."
Relative to the official baseline, this revenue loss results in in-
creased government debt. The overall impact on the budget is the
sum of the revenue loss plus the additional debt service on the higher
level of public debt. With debt service costs included, the budgetary
cost of the tax cuts as legislated for fiscal years 2001 to 2011 is $2.3
trillion, or 1.6% of GDP."
These estimates assume that the tax cuts expire as scheduled tin-
der current law and that no adjustment to the AMT is made. If instead
the tax cuts are made permanent, as proposed by the Bush administra-
tion, and the AMT is reformed, the revenue losses through 2011 would
rise by more than 25%. To develop these alternative estimates, we first
construct a baseline in which the AMT has been reformed. Then we
examine the cost of the tax cuts relative to this baseline and assume the
tax cuts have been extended past their official sunsets. Consistent with
the Bush administration's stance, however, we do not assume that the
bonus depreciation provision is extended. 25 In particular, we use the
Tax Policy Center (the "TPC") model to estimate the combined reve-
nue effect of the 2001 and 2003 individual income and estate tax cuts
relative to a baseline in which the AMT had been reformed." We then
23 Technically, making the tax cuts permanent would involve some relatively minor
outlay expenses—for example, for the refundable portions of the earned income credit
and the child credit—as well as revenue losses. Our discussion of "revenue losses" includes
those direct outlay components.
24 We estimate debt service costs using a matrix of projected interest rates generated
by the Congressional Budget Office (the "CBO") for this purpose.
25 Another approach, which we adopt in our discussion of distributional effects of the
tax cuts, calculates the additional revenue cost of keeping the AMT on its pre-2001 trajec-
tory, in terms of revenue and the number of taxpayers subject to it. The results from these
two approaches are quite similar: the estimated individual income tax revenue loss in 2014
is $300 billion under the approach adopted in this Part and $286 billion under the alter-
native approach of keeping the AMT on its pre-2001 trajectory. The difference in 2014 is
0.08% of gross domestic product ("GDP")
2° See TAX POLICY CTR., URBAN INST. & BROOKINGS INST., OVERVIEW OF THE TAX POL-
ICY CENTER MICROSIMULATION Monui., at http://taxpolicycenter.org/TaxModel/tmdb/
TMTemplate.cfm?DocID=299 (Jan. 14, 2004) (describing the Tax Policy Center (the
'TPC") model). The AMT reform assumes a higher AMT exemption level, allows personal
non-refundable credits against the AMT, and indexes the AMT to inflation. Under these
assumptions, the number of tax-filing units on the AMT in 2014, assuming the 2001 and
2003 Acts are extended, is about 5.5 million. Note that the TPC model estimates do not
incorporate microeconomic behavioral responses, as the official Joint Committee on Taxa-
tion (the "JCT") estimates do. We therefore scale the official JCT and CBO estimates by
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add estimates from the JCT for the temporary bonus depreciation pro-
vision and the expansion of expensing in section 179 of the Internal
Revenue Code (along with extension of the section 179 provision) to
obtain our overall estimates." The revenue loss would be $2.2 trillion
and the budget cost including debt service would be $2.8 trillion. For
the ten-year period from 2005 through 2014, the revenue loss amounts
to $2.7 trillion, or 1.8% of GDP and the budget costs with debt service
amount to $3.7 trillion, or 2.5% of GDP.
As shown in Figure 2, the adjusted revenue loss peaks at 2.4% of
GDP in 2004, after which it declines somewhat as the bonus deprecia-
tion provision expires. 28 In subsequent years, the revenue loss begins
to climb again, as the remaining backloaded provisions of EGTRRA
(including the estate tax reductions and the elimination of the phase-
out of itemized deductions and the personal exemption) take effect.
By 2011, the revenue loss again exceeds 2.0% of GDP. 29 By 2014, the
revenue loss associated with making the tax cuts permanent (assum-
ing the AMT has been reformed) is $400 billion and the budget cost
with debt service is more than $600 billion. These figures represent
2.2% and 3.4% of GDP in that year, respectively.
One way to gauge the magnitude of the tax cuts is to examine the
policy changes that would be necessary to pay for the revenue losses
from making the tax cuts permanent (assuming the AMT had already
been reformed). As shown in Table 4, financing the tax cuts in 2014
would imply one of the following options or changes of a similar
magnitude (relative to the CBO baseline):
• A 48% cut in Social Security benefits;
• A 57% cut in Medicare benefits;
• Complete elimination of the federal component of the Medicaid
program;
• A 12% cut in all non-interest spending;
the ratio of the TPC estimates against the baseline in which the AMT is reformed to the
TPC estimates against the official baseline in which the AMT is not reformed.
21 The extension of the expansion of section 179 of the Internal Revenue Code is at-
tributed to the 2003 legislation in Table 3.
"The jagged pattern of revenue losses around 2011 in Figure 2 likely reflects the fact
that these figures combine estimates from different sources; some of the estimates are
intended to measure the cost of the tax cuts as enacted and others to measure the cost of
extending the tax cuts.
" The estimates in Table 3 and Figure 2 omit the effects of any changes in GDP and
interest rates caused by the recent tax policies. These effects are discussed infra notes 155-
198 and accompanying text.
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• A 53% cut in all spending other than interest, defense, homeland
security, Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid;
• An 80% cut in all domestic discretionary spending;
• A 34% increase in payroll taxes; or
• A 124% increase in corporate tax revenues.
These figures represent spending cuts and revenue increases that are
well beyond the range of those currently in any public discussion.
Another way to put the tax cuts in perspective is to compare them
to the 1981 Ronald W. Reagan administration tax cut (the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 or "ERTA"). Such comparisons are compli-
cated by two factors. First, the tax code was not indexed to the price
level before 1985, generating a natural upward "creep" in tax collec-
tions over time, as inflation pushed individuals into higher tax brack-
ets. This means that some "tax reductions" were really just offsetting
the effects of inflation. Second, realizing that the 1981 tax cut was ex-
cessively costly, the Reagan administration worked to scale it back one
year later. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Resnonsibility Act of 1982
("TEFRA") increased revenue significan4 30 The revenue costs of
ERTA, measured against an inflation-indexed baseline and net of the
revenue increase in TEFRA, amounted to about 2.1% of GDP. 3I Thus,
under reasonable interpretations of the size of the Reagan tax cuts,
the recent tax cuts are approximately the same size.
2. Long-Term Horizons
To examine the long-term budgetary effects of making the tax
cuts permanent, we use the adjusted revenue estimates shown above
and assume that the revenue loss remains constant as a share of GDP
after 2014. 32 Under these assumptions, Table 5 shows that the 2001
and 2003 tax cuts, if made permanent, would reduce revenues by
2.2% of GDP through 2080 and over an infinite horizon. In present
5° The CBO notes that these "tax increases partly offset the revenue effects of ERTA by
offsetting almost two-thirds of the ERTA corporate income tax reductions and about 10
percent of the ERTA individual income tax reductions." CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, BASELINE
BUDGET PROJECTIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 1984-1988, at 27 (1983), available at http://www.
cbo.crov/ftpdocs/50xx/doc5055/doc05a.pdf (last modified Feb. 17, 2004).
II PETER R. ORSZAG, CFR. ON BUDGET Sc POLICY PRIORITIES, Tilt BUSH TAX CUT Is
Now ABOUT"THE SAME SIZE AS THE REAGAN TAX CUTS (Apr. 19, 2001), available at http://
www.cbpp.org/4-19-01tax.pdf.
32 SCC supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
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value, making the tax cuts permanent would reduce revenue by $11
trillion through 2080 and $18 trillion over an infinite horizon."
To put these figures in context, over the next seventy-five years,
the actuarial deficit in the Social Security system is 0.7% of GDP tin-
der the Trustees' assumptions and about 0.4% of GDP under new pro-
jections issued by the CB0." Thus, if the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts were
made permanent, the revenue loss over the next seventy-five years
would be roughly three to five times as much as the actuarial shortfall
in Social Security over the same period. The actuarial deficit in Social
Security over an infinite horizon amounts to 1.2% of GDP, which is
smaller than the 2.2% of GDP in revenue losses from the tax cuts over
the same horizon.
B. The Federal Budget Outlook
The justification for and effects of the tax cut depend
significantly on the federal budget outlook. Just as the tax cuts are
usefully examined over a ten-year window and longer periods, we use
both time horizons to examine the budget outlook.
1. Within the Ten Year Budget Window
a. The Official and Adjusted Baselines: 2001
The January 2001 CBO budget baseline formed the basis of tax
and fiscal policy discussions in the winter and spring of 2001. Under
the baseline, the federal budget faced a projected surplus of $5.6 tril-
lion over the subsequent decade, with surpluses rising over time."
Using this information, supporters argued that the tax cuts were af-
fordable and simply involved refunding to the American people an
over-charge on their taxes.
33 This is consistent with the results by Peter Orszag, Richard Kogan, and Robert
Greenstein, who estimate that the 2001 and 2003 cuts, if made permanent, would reduce
revenues by between $9.5 trillion and $11.6 trillion in present value over the seventy-five
years between 2003 and 2077, depending on the specifics of the AMT reform. PETER R.
Ottsz.w. rr AL., CTR. ON BUDGET 13c POLICY PRIORITIES, THE ADMINISTRATION'S TAX CMS
AND THE LONG-TERM BUDGET Ou-nooK, available at http://www.cbpp.org/3-5-03bud.pdf
(last revised Mar. 19, 2003).
34 CONG, BUDGET OFFICE, THE OUTLOOK FOR SOCIAL SECURITY (2004), available at
http://www.cbo.goviftpdocs/55xx/doc5530/06-14-SocialSecurity.pdf  (last modified June
17, 2004).
95 Infra fig.3 (top line).
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The baseline, however, is an extremely misleading indicator of
the government's financial status under plausible policy trajectories."
The baseline uses cash-flow accounting, which is appropriate for many
programs, but which can distort the financial status of programs with
liabilities that increase substantially outside the projection period. in
2001, the trust funds for Social Security, Medicare Part A, and gov-
ernment employee pensions accounted for $3.3 trillion of the $5.6
trillion surplus, but these Trust Funds then faced (and continue to
face now) long-term financial shortfalls. Another concern is that the
baseline holds real discretionary spending constant over time. In a
growing economy with an expanding population, this assumption is
neither credible nor consistent with historical evidence. The baseline
also assumes that all tax provisions expire as scheduled, even though
most have been extended routinely in the past, and it further assumes
that no AMT fix is provided in the future.
Adjusting for these factors has an enormous impact on ten-year
budget projections. For example, in January 2001, the ten-year sur-
plus would have been just $1.6 trillion if (1) the retirement trust.
funds were removed from the calculations, (2) discretionary spending
were allowed to grow with inflation and the population, and (3) all
expiring tax provisions were extended and the AMT was adjusted to
hold the number of AMT taxpayers roughly constant over time."
Thus, even in the heady budget days of early 2001, a realistic and
meaningful projection would have generated a ten-year budget sur-
plus much lower than the official figures indicated and actually
smaller than the budget cost of EGTRRA reported in Table 3.
b. Changes in the Ten-Year Fiscal Outlook
Between January 2001 and March 2004, the fiscal status of the
government deteriorated markedly, as shown in Figure 3. By March
2004, the baseline budget for 2002 through 2011 projected a deficit of
$2.9 trillion. This represents a decline in fiscal status of $8.5 trillion
since January 2001, equivalent to 6.1% of projected GDP over the
decade. The decline appears to be permanent, with a substantial de- ,
cline in every year. Figure 3 also shows the sources of the deteriora-
" To be perfectly clear, the baseline is not intended to be a measure of the financial
status of the government under plausible policy projections. Hence, our criticisms are not
so much of the baseline per se, but of the common use of the baseline projections as a
proxy for the fiscal status of the government.
37 See generally Auerbach & Gale, supra note 19.
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tion in the budget. The tax cuts, as legislated, explain 28% of the de-
cline." Changes in defense and homeland security and economic and
technical changes account, respectively, for 19% and 39% of the
change. Other non-interest spending accounts for about 14%.
c. The Official and Adjusted Baselines: 2004
Figure 4 shows the official and adjusted baselines as of March
2004, as shares of GDP. The CEO projects a ten-year baseline unified
budget deficit of $2.0 trillion, or 1.3% of GDP, for fiscal years 2005
through 2014. (The budget outside of Social Security faces a baseline
deficit of $4.3 trillion.) If the expiring tax provisions are extended,
the AMT is held in check, and real discretionary spending grows with
the population, the ten-year unified budget deficit will be $5.6 trillion
(3.8% of GDP), with deficits of 3.4% of GDP or more in every year.
Outside of the trust funds for Social Security, Medicare Part A, and
government employee pensions, the adjusted ten-year budget faces a
deficit of $8.6 trillion over the next decade (5.8% of GDP). The dif-
ferences between the CBO baseline and the adjusted unified budget
projections grow over time. In 2014 alone, the difference is more than
$1 trillion (6.1% of GDP). Thus, while the official baseline projections
show shrinking deficits over time, the adjusted measures show deficits
that rise persistently over time.
2. Longer-Term Horizons
As noted above, the retirement trust funds face short-term cash
flow surpluses but long-term financial shortfalls." Capturing these
effects requires extending the time horizon of the analysis. To do this,
we report estimates of the fiscal gap, which is the size of the immedi-
ate and permanent increase in taxes or reductions in non-interest ex-
penditures that would be required to establish the same debt to GDP
ratio in the long run as holds currently.°
38
 This estimate assumes that the tax cuts expire as scheduled and that the AMT is not
adjusted. If instead the tax cuts are made permanent and the AMT is reformed as de-
scribed above, the share of the projected fiscal decline due to tax cuts will rise.
39 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
40 See generally Alan Auerbach, The U.S. Focal Problem: Where We Are, How We Got Here and
Where Were Going, in NBER MACROECONOMICS ANN UAL 1994, at 141 (Stanley Fischer 84 Julio
Rotemberg eds., 1994). Over an infinite planning horizon, this requirement is equivalent to
assuming that the debt to GDP ratio does not explode. Alternatively, the adjustments set the
present value of all future primary surpluses equal to the current value of the national debt,
in which the primary surplus is the difference between revenues and non-interest expendi-
2004]	 Economic Assessment of Bush Administration Tax Policy	 1175
Alan Auerbach and William Gale estimate that, despite running
large cash-flow surpluses at the time, the federal government faced a
fiscal gap in 2001 of 1.45% of GDP through 2070 and 4.14% of GDP
on a permanent basis.'" A more recent study estimates a long-term
fiscal gap in 2004 of 7.2% of GDP through 2080 and 10.5% of GDP on
a permanent basis. 42 The increase of roughly 6 percentage points of
GDP in the long-term fiscal gap approximates the decline in the ten-
year baseline budget projections noted in Figure 3. Because the tax
cuts account for 2.2% of GDP over the long-term, they significantly
exacerbate the fiscal gap.
3. Uncertainty in Budget Projections
Substantial uncertainty surrounds the short- and long-term
budget projections described above. 43 Much of the problem stems
from the fact that the surplus or deficit is the difference between two
large quantities—taxes and spending. Small percentage errors in ei-
ther one can cause large percentage changes in the difference be-
tween them. Furthermore, small differences in growth rates sustained
for extended periods can have surprisingly large economic effects.
Such uncertainty makes budget projections imprecise. Nonetheless,
almost all studies that have examined the issue suggest that even if
major sources of uncertainty are accounted for, serious long-term fis-
cal problems will remain.'"
tures. See generally Alan Auerbach et al., Budget Blues: The Fiscal Outlook and Options for Reform,
in AGENDA FOR THE NATION 109 (Henry Aaron et al. eds., 2003) (discussing the relationship
between the fiscal gap, generational accounting, accrual accounting, and other ways of ac-
counting for government), available at http://wwwbrook,edu/views/papers/gale/20030501.
pdf; Alan J. Auerbach, et al., Sources of the Long-Term Fiscal Gap, 103 Mot Noms 1049 (2004)
(hereinafter Auerbach et al, Long-Term Fiscal Gap] (providing recent estimates of the fiscal
gap). available at hup://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/gale/20040524.pdf.
-"Auerbach & Gale, supra note 19.
42 Auerbach et al., Long-Term Fiscal Gap, supra note 40. The figures in Auerbach & Gale,
supra note 19 and Auerbach et al., Long-Term Fiscal Gap, supra note 40 are not strictly com-
parable because the two studies make slightly different assumptions with respect to the
AMT, but the difference is a rounding error compared to an increase in the fiscal gap of
6% of GDP.
43 See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
44 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: AN UPDATE 45
(2001), available at http://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/30xx/doc5019/EntireReport.pdf (last modified
Sept. 5, 2001). See generally RONALD LEE & RYAN EDWARDS, THE FISCAL IMPACT OF POPULA-
TION AGING IN THE US: ASSESSING THE, UNCERTAIN11ES (Ctr. for the Econ. & Demography
of Aging, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, CEDA Paper No. 2002-0001CL, 2002), available at
http://repositories.cd1 ib.org/cgi/viewcon ten t.cgi?article=1000&con	 iber/ceda; John
B. Shovel], The Impact of Major Lift Expectancy Improvements in the Financing of Social Security,
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C. Discussion
Several implications arise from the data presented above. 45 First,
tax cuts are not simply a matter of returning unneeded or unused
funds to taxpayers. Tax cuts represent a choice by current voters ei-
ther (1) to require future taxpayers to pay for current spending, or
(2) to cut spending. As shown above, the spending cuts or other tax
increases required to pay for making the tax cuts permanent would be
monumental.
Second, the presence of a long-term fiscal gap in 2001, despite
current cash-flow surpluses, suggests that making the tax cuts perma-
nent was not affordable at that time. The vast deterioration in both
the ten-year and long-term budget outlook since then suggests that if
making the tax cuts permanent was not affordable in 2001, it is far
less so today.
Third, the results provide useful perspectives on the claim by
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan that tax cuts were
needed in 2001 to avoid having the wovernment pay off all available
marketable Treasury debt by 2006. 48 When large budget surpluses
were projected under the official estimates in January 2001, Alan
Greenspan and others argued that the consequences of eliminating
the market for Treasury bonds and of investing additional govern-
ment surpluses in private assets were so costly that immediate tax
cuts could be justified.
An alternative view noted that the prospect of paying off the pub-
lic debt required a continuation of high productivity growth, which
was uncertain; challenged the view that paying off the public debt
would cause the serious problems that Alan Greenspan envisioned;
and noted that even if the feared events did have significant costs,
there was plenty of time to make the needed corrections in the fu-
ture.47
 The subsequent deterioration in the fiscal outlook (Figure 3)
has eliminated any "risk" that the public debt will be paid off.
Medicare, and Medicaid, in COPING WITH METHUSELAH: THE IMPACT OF MOLECULAR BIOLOGY
ON MEDICINE AND SOCIETY 166 (Henry J. Aaron & William B. Schwartz eds., 2002).
45 See supra notes 23-44 and accompanying text.
46
 See generally Outlook for the Federal Budget and Implications for Fiscal Policy: Hearing Before the
Senate Canon. on the Budget, 107th Cong. (2001) (testimony of Alan Greenspan, Chairman,
Fed. Reserve Board), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/
2001/20010125/default.htm (last updated Jan. 25, 2001).
47 See generally The Budget and Long-Tenn Fiscal Policy: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
the Budget, 107th Cong. (2001) (testimony of Peter R. Orszag), available at hup://www
sbgo.com/Papers/Testimony%20to%20Senate%20Budget%20Conunittee%20 —%20Febru
ary%207,%202001.PDF; William G. Gale & Samara R. Potter, An Economic Evaluation of the
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Fourth, as noted above, against comparable baselines, the Bush
administration's tax cuts are about the same share of the economy as
those in the early 1980s. 48 The nation, however, was much better pre-
pared to deal with large tax cuts and fiscal deficits in the 1980s and
early 1990s than it is now. The retirement of the baby boomers is
twenty years closer now, giving the budget little time to recover before
the fiscal pressures begin in earnest. Private saving was significantly
higher in the early 1980s than it is now, and public debt was a smaller
share of GDP. Furthermore, the United States was an international
creditor then, but it is a substantial international debtor today." As-
suming an increasing risk premium associated with government debt
or with the nation's net indebtedness to foreigners, the facts that pub-
licly held debt is a higher share of GDP now and that the net interna-
tional investment position has declined markedly since the early 1980s
increase the marginal cost of a tax cut now relative to then. 88
The economic benefit, furthermore, was likely higher because
marginal tax rates were substantially higher then, raising the eco-
nomic benefit of marginal tax rate cuts relative to today. 81 Finally, the
nation was willing and able to respond to the 1981 tax cut by raising
taxes in 1982, 1984, 1990, and 1993. Currently, however, the Bush
administration shows no interest in considering corrective tax meas-
ures, President Bush has signed the "no new taxes" pledge, and it is
doubtful that the spending cuts that would be needed to finance the
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act, 55 NAT'L TAX J. 133 (2002); Alice Rivlin,
Why Fight the Surplus?, N.Y. Tim s, Jan. 30, 2001, at A23.
49 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
49 Sec generally William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, The Real Fiscal Danger, 99 TAx NOTES
429 (2003).
99 See generally Robert E. Rubin et al., Sustained Budget Deficits: Longer-Run U.S. Economic
Performance and the Risk of Financial and Fiscal Disarray (2004) (paper presented at AEA-
NAEFA Joint Session, Allied Social Science Associations Annual Meetings, The Andrew
Brirnmer Policy Forum, 'National Economic and Financial Policies for Growth and Stabil-
ity" Jan. 4, 2004), available at http://www.brook.edu/views/papers/orszag/20040105.pdf
(last modified Dec. 31, 2003).
91
 A marginal tax cut of, for example, 5 percentage points has a more pronounced ef-
fect the higher the initial marginal tax rate is. A variety of economic activities are affected by
the after-tax return, which depends on (1 t). Because (1 — t)/(1 — t — 0.05) is larger the
larger ( is, the effect of a 5 percentage point tax cut is larger the higher the initial tax rate.
For example, reducing tax rates from 70% to 65% raises the after-tax return from 30% to
35%, or by one-sixth; reducing tax rates from 40% to 35% raises the after-tax return from
60% to 65%, or about one-twelfth. Similarly, the distortions caused by a tax are proportional
to the square of the tax rate. See generally HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE (2d ed. 1988)
(providing textbook exposition). The implication is that even if marginal tax cuts have the
potential to stimulate growth and to improve economic performance, a given marginal
reduction is less likely to do so now than in the 1980s when marginal rates were higher.
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proposed tax cuts will emerge, especially because defense and manda-
tory spending are slated to increase as a percentage of GDP. 52
Fifth, the perspectives above on the size of the tax cut and the
cost of financing it cast doubt on the claim, often put forward by pro-
ponents of extending the tax cuts, that such extensions are necessary
to reduce uncertainty.55 The fundamental source of uncertainty sur-
rounding spending and tax programs is the existence of a large long-
term fiscal gap. Households and firms do not know how or when that
fiscal gap will be eliminated, as eventually it must be to avoid fiscal
collapse. Making the tax cuts permanent increases the underlying fis-
cal gap and hence actually raises uncertainty by expanding the size of
the gap that eventually must be closed. Given the size of the fiscal
shortfall, making the tax cuts permanent also may raise legitimate
questions about whether implicit or explicit default is a non-trivial
possibility, which could spark further uncertainty, most notably in
financial markets. 54
It would be utterly nonsensical to claim that doubling the size of
the seventy-five-year actuarial shortfall in Social Security and Medicare
Part A would 'reduce uncertainty about future tax and spending policy.
But making the tax cuts permanent would increase the fiscal gap to
the same extent as doubling the actuarial shortfall. Likewise, the con-
tentious fiscal policy debates of the 1980s and 1990s suggest strongly
that cutting revenues by as much as the Reagan tax cuts should not be
seen as a way to instill stability in the nation's tax and spending sys-
tems. Thus, the notion that making the tax cuts permanent would re-
duce uncertainty is misguided.
D. What About "Starve the Beast?"
The thrust of the analysis above is that tax cuts generally raise
budget deficits and that large, permanent tax cuts are a threat to fiscal
stability, especially when the country faces large fiscal shortfalls, even
if the tax cuts are not made permanent. 55 An alternative theory is that
52 See generally William G. Gale & Brennan Kelly, The No New Taxes" Pledge, 104 TAX
Noms 197 (2004).
55 See, e.g., Harvey S. Rosen, Council of Econ. Advisers, The Case for Making the Tax
Cuts Permanent, Remarks for the National Tax Association Spring Symposium (May 20,
2004), http://wmv.whitehouse.govicea/nta-spring.html  (last visited Nov. 15, 2004).
" Rubin et al., supra note 50.
55 See supra notes 23-54 and accompanying text.
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one reason to favor a tax cut is precisely to create pressure to reduce
government spending. 56
In the context of the Bush administration's tax cuts, this claim
has at least three components, which include assertions that tax cuts
in general are a good way to restrain spending; that the Bush admini-
stration's tax cuts in particular, and the effort to make them perma-
nent, are justified by the "starve the beast" theory; and that spending
reductions are desirable.
1. Are Tax Cuts an Effective, Safe Way to Reduce Spending?
The "starve the beast" approach simply may not work as a politi-
cal equilibrium. We have in mind that policymakers jointly go
through periods of fiscal restraint and fiscal largesse, and the restraint
or largesse occurs simultaneously on both the tax and spending sides.
That is, periods of fiscal largesse tend to generate declines in taxes
and increases in spending (as shares of GDP). Periods of fiscal disci-
pline tend to provide declines in spending and increases in taxes.
If this characterization is correct, then granting large tax cuts to
some groups in an effort to "starve the beast" would make it less po-
litically feasible to rein in the desires of other constituencies to obtain
increases in spending programs: Although crises do tend to force ac-
tion, a transparently self-imposed crisis is different from a crisis im-
posed by external forces. For example, forcing a fiscal crisis through
tax cuts skewed to high-income households could stall rather than
encourage entitlement reform, because those who would be adversely
affected by changes under consideration in Social Security or Medi-
care may argue that reversing the recent tax cuts would obviate the
need for many of the painful benefit and payroll tax changes.
In short, abandoning fiscal discipline on one side of the budget
could induce a period of fiscal irresponsibility on both sides of the
budget. As a result, it is not even clear whether tax cuts encourage
spending increases or restraint, let alone whether they encourage suf-
ficient restraint to offset the entire revenue loss from the tax cut itself.
This "coordinated fiscal discipline" view implies that "starve the
beast" will not work, and it is supported by several suggestive pieces of
evidence. First, it is hard to believe that spending would actually have
increased by much more than it did between 2000 and 2004 if the tax
cuts had not been enacted. Discretionary spending rose from 6.3% of
M See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, The Real Reason We Need a Tax Cut, BUSINESSWEEK, Mar. 19
2001, at 28.
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GDP in 2000 to 7.6% in 2003 and a projected 7.8% in 2004, while a
massive new entitlement program (the Medicare prescription drug
benefit) was also created. All of these spending increases occurred
during a period with several large tax cuts and downward revisions to
the technical and economic components of the budget forecast.
Second, in practice, budget rules and legislative agreements have
proven effective in reducing spending and balancing the budget
when restrictions were placed on both tax cuts and spending increases
at the same time. The rules imposed in 1990 and extended in 1993
and 1997 imposed restraints on both sides of the budget. Tax cuts and
mandatory spending increases had to be paid for with other tax in-
creases or mandatory spending cuts. Discretionary spending was sub-
ject to caps. Likewise, the budget deals that were enacted in 1990 and
1993 involved both spending cuts and revenue increases. There is no
U.S. evidence of fiscal balance being obtained solely through spend-
ing reductions (with the possible exception of reductions in military
expenses after a war ended).
Third, the voting records of signers of the "no new taxes" pledge
are hard to reconcile with a "starve the beast" theory. 57
 The pledge
signers voted overwhelmingly in favor of the Bush administration's
tax cuts. In light of those votes, the deteriorating budget outlook, and
the fact that they have removed tax increases as a potential fiscal solu-
tion, the signers might be expected to be vigilant against spending
increases. Yet 86% of signers favored the Medicare prescription drug
bill, and almost three-quarters supported the 2004 pork-laden high-
way bill. These records are inconsistent with the "starve the beast"
theory because the same people who voted for permanent tax cuts
also voted for permanent spending increases, and they did so at a
time of projections of falling long-term revenues.
Fourth, the "starve the beast" theory suggests that revenues and
spending are positively correlated (for example, lower revenues gener-
ate lower spending), whereas the coordinated fiscal discipline view im-
plies that revenues and spending are negatively correlated. Figure 5
shows that descriptive data since 1981 generally display the pattern
suggested by coordinated discipline. 58
 Even after controlling for the
57
 Gale & Kelly, supra note 52.
55
 Figure 5 reports spending and revenue data that have been "standardized"—that is,
with business cycle effects removed. Business cycle considerations will induce a negative
correlation between taxes and spending: in good times, taxes are higher as a share of GDP,
because the tax system is progressive, and spending is lower as a share of GDP, because the
burdens of welfare and unemployment insurance and related programs are smaller. We
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business cycle, changes in spending and changes in taxes are negatively
correlated over three major periods. Between 2000 and 2004, revenues
fell relative to GDP, but spending rose. 59 Between 1992 and 2000, reve-
nues rose and spending fell. Between 1981 and 1992, revenues fell and
total outlays rose. All of these patterns above are inconsistent with the
"starve the beast" view.60 Thus, lower revenues have proven to be nei-
ther necessary (witness the 1990s) nor sufficient (witness the 1980s and
the period since 2000) to reduce federal spending.
The formal econometric evidence on whether tax reductions are
followed by subsequent spending reductions is mixed.Ot Evidence
does suggest that larger budget deficits constrain both spending in-
creases and tax reductions." This evidence, however, does not distin-
guish between the two views noted above.° In particular, the evidence
does not imply that revenue reductions will automatically induce
spending reductions. The reason is that the evidence is based on his-
torical experiences in which both spending reductions and tax in-
creases were considered jointly as part of fiscal restraint packages.
Therefore, the evidence may not apply to a scenario in which the en-
tire adjustment is constrained to occur on the spending side, as the
"starve the beast" approach would demand.
define standardized non-interest outlays as standardized aggregate outlays less actual net
interest payments.
69 Only half of the increase in non-interest spending was due to increased defense and
homeland security in response to the 2001 terrorist attacks and the wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq.
69 See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. There is one data pattern that at least
is not inconsistent with the theory. Between 1981 and 1992, as revenue fell, standardized
non-interest spending also fell, but only by 0.4% of GDP. This can hardly be taken as evi-
dence of effective fiscal discipline, though. The ratio of public debt to GDP almost dou-
bled, from 26% in 1981 to 48% in 1992, the largest peacetime growth in the debt ever
other than during the Great Depression.
01 See generally Neela Manage & Michael L. Marlow, The Causal Relation Between Federal
Expenditures and Receipts, 52 S. Econ. J. 616 (1986) (finding that tax reductions trigger
spending cuts). But see generally William Anderson et al., Government Spending and Taxation:
What Causes Wluit?, 52 S. Econ..). 630 (1986); George M. von Furstenberg et al., Tax and
Spend or Spend and Tax?, 68 REV. ECON. & STAT. 179 (1986) (finding no robust relationship
between tax changes and subsequent spending changes).
62 Alan J. Auerbach, American Fiscal Policy in the Post-War Era: An Interpretive Histoty
(2004) (paper prepared for the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston's conference, The Macro-
economics of Fiscal Policy," June 2004; forthcoming publication of conference by M.I.T.
Press); Henning Bohn, Budget Balance Through Revenue or Spending Adjustments? Some
Historical Evidence for the United States (Wharton Sch., Weiss Ctr. for Intl Fin. Research,
Working Paper No. 3-91, 1991) (revised version published as 27 J. MONETARY Econ. 333
(1991)).
65 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
1182	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 45:1157
At the very least, it should be clear that there is no compelling
evidence that tax cuts constrain spending. The consequences, how-
ever, of cutting taxes and then not cutting spending could be severe.
To the extent that the "starve the beast" strategy is employed but does
not work, the eventual outcome could be a full-blown fiscal crisis. 64
Fortunately, there are other ways to impose fiscal discipline and
reduce spending—if that is the goal—that are both more likely to be
effective and less risky if they fail than the tax cuts advocated by "starve
the beast" supporters. One approach would be to place more emphasis
in the budget process on the long-term fiscal imbalance facing the na-
tion or the adjusted ten-year budget measures discussed above.° Like
tax cuts, this would reduce the reported surplus or increase the re-
ported deficit. Unlike tax cuts, however, reforming budget procedures
would provide a more accurate picture of the government's finances,
would not encourage unaffordable tax cuts (or unaffordable spending
increases), and would not create deeper fiscal problems if it failed to
restrain spending. Thus, if the goal is to restrict spending, budget re-
form would likely be at least as effective as, and significantly less risky
than, tax cuts. 66
2. Does "Starve the Beast" Justify the Bush Administration Tax Cuts?
Even if the "starve the beast" strategy "worked" in the sense that
tax cuts restrained government spending and that such restraint was
desirable, the result would not justify the Bush administration's tax
cuts or an effort to make them permanent for three reasons.
First, many components of government spending predominantly
benefit low- and middle-income households. 67 On fairness grounds, a
tax cut whose goal or effect is to cut spending should offset the nega-
tive impact on low- and middle-income households by giving them a
disproportionately large share of the tax cut. The 2001 and 2003 tax
cuts, however, do just the opposite—they tilt benefits toward high-
income households as discussed below. 68
Second, and perhaps more importantly, whatever resonance
"starve the beast" had in 2001, when the government ran current cash-
flow surpluses, the government by 2003 was running substantial
64 See generally Rubin et al., supra note 50.
66 See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
66 See generally Gale & Potter, supra note 47.
67 See generally C. Eugene Steuerle, The 2001 Tax Legislation from a Lang-Term Perspective,
54 NAT'L TAXI 427 (2001).
63 See infra notes 79-91 and accompanying text.
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deficits, so the argument that the tax cuts were necessary to dissipate a
surplus that otherwise would have been spent simply was not applica-
ble. Likewise, and even more importantly, with the country facing sys-
tematic medium- and long-term deficits, a "starve the beast" motivation
for making the tax cuts permanent ignores the budgetary context in
which those tax cut extensions would be occurring.
3. Are Spending Cuts Desirable?
If tax cuts do reduce government spending or if spending is re-
duced some other way, an important question is what other effects
that decline creates. Some scholars find cross-country evidence that
higher government spending reduces economic growth, 69 but a num-
ber of caveats apply because the results differ across developing and
developed countries, and across types of spending." A number of
econometric problems make disentangling the effects of government
spending particularly difficult." Spending also may affect other as-
pects of economic well-being (for example, the environment) or the
distribution of income. Hence, a full analysis of spending should ac-
count for all of these issues.
E. Sunsets
The analysis above is significantly complicated by the unusual role
played by sunsets in the tax cuts." These sunsets represent a drainatic
departure from previous practice in the use of expiring tax provisions.
Such provisions have always existed, but have generally applied only to
a few minor items or to explicitly temporary tax policies. For example,
in January 1992, extending all of the expiring provisions (tax cuts and
tax increases) actually would have raised revenue by $9 billion by 1997.
By January 2002, extending all temporary provisions would have re-
duced revenue by $38 billion in 2007 and $297 billion in 2012. The in-
crease largely reflects the effects of the sunsets in the 2001 legislation.
See generally Robert J. Barro, Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries, 106 Q.J.
Econ. 407 (1991).
To See generally Kevin Grier & Gordon 'hillock, An Empirical Analysis of Cross-National Eco-
nomic Growth, 19.51-80, 24 J. MONETARY EcoN. 259 (1989).
71 Sec generally Joel Slemrod, What Can Be Learned from Cross-Country Studies About Taxes,
Prosperity, and Economic Growth?, in 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. Ac•lvircv 373 (William
C. Brainard & George L. Perry eds., 1995).
72 See supra notes 23-71 and accompanying text.
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By January 2004, the cost of extending all temporary provisions in 2014
would be $431 billion, or 2.4% of GDP."
The extensive use of sunsets creates uncertainty with regard to
expectations about future tax policy. It also creates significant com-
plexity in tax planning and in simply understanding the law. Whether
sunsets are a good idea depends in large part on why they were en-
acted. Two sets of arguments could justify sunsets in principle, but
neither applies in practice to the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts.
First, in cases where tax incentives should be temporary, sunsets
represent sound policy. 74
 But it should be clear that the massive re-
cent increase in sunsets is not motivated by an increased desire for
truly temporary tax cuts.
Second, even sunsets on provisions that are otherwise intended
to be permanent could be construed to have some value. 75 Control-
ling for the size of an annual tax cut, a sunset may provide more fu-
ture policy flexibility than a permanent tax cut, because it is pre-
sumably easier politically to allow a sunset to take effect than to
reverse a tax cut explicitly. Thus, the sunsets in principle might make
it easier to renegotiate the structure and level of taxes, if for no other
reason than that they will focus attention on the issue. They therefore
could help policymakers address, in the near future, the long-term
fiscal gap facing the nation. But a reality check is appropriate. To the
extent that policymakers in the near future will be disproportionately
the same people who rushed to embrace sunsets as a way of avoiding
hard budget decisions, we suspect this view may prove optimistic.
In fact, sunsets over the past few years clearly have been used to
hide the true budgetary costs of intended policies and to increase the
underlying size of the annual tax cut by allowing a larger annual tax
cut to fit within a given multi-year budget total. In essence, the Bush
administration gambled in 2001 and again in 2003 that it could get
73
 See generally William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, Bush's New Tax Code, Tee PoLrric
(Yale), May 8, 2004, available at http://www.thepolitic.org/.
74
 For example, a temporary investment incentive is likely to prove more effective in
the short term than a permanent incentive, because it encourages firms to substitute fu-
ture investment for current investment. The longer the "temporary" incentive is in place,
however, the less credible this motivation appears and the more the sunset seems like an
accounting gimmick intended to hide the longer-term cost of the provision. Moreover,
removing the sunset in this case would be counterproductive, given the purpose of the
original policy, and removing or extending the sunset in advance of its termination date
would be particularly damaging to the original goal.
75 See generally John Maggs, When Permanent Is Temporary, 35 NAT'L J. 1477 (2003); Alan
Murray, Tax Break's "Sunset" May Set the Stage for Fiscal Reckoning, WALL ST. J., May 20, 2003,
at A4.
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the larger annual tax cuts enacted and then made permanent at a fu-
ture date, rather than adopting smaller tax cuts that very likely could
have been made permanent in the first place (at least in 2001, al-
though the situation in 2003 is more difficult to evaluate). 76 Policy-
makers supporting sunsets have every intention of trying to make the
policies permanent.77 For example, Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives Dennis Hastert indicated just after the House passed the
2003 tax cut that "`Whe $350 [billion] number takes us through the
next two years, basically,' . 'But also it could end up being a trillion-
dollar bill, because this stuff is extendable. That's a fight we're going
to have to have. It's not a bad fight to have.'"78
Filially, it is worth noting that sunsets of tax provisions create a
classic political economy asymmetry in which one (often relatively
small) group has much to gain and each member of the general pub-
lic has only a little to lose. Political economy theory predicts, and evi-
dence confirms, that in such situations, the will of the active minority
dominates that of the passive majority. Historically, the sunset provi-
sions fit this model well. Even now, with the massive increase in sun-
78 In contrast to the 2001 and 2003 Acts, the 2002 tax cut explicitly was intended to be
temporary. In particular, the bonus depreciation provision was intended to be temporary
and thereby to create an incentive to accelerate investment that had been planned for the
future. To the Bush administration's credit, the budget notes explicitly that the provision
was intended to be temporary and opposes making the provision permanent.
77 Some policymakers argue that they were somehow forced into adopting the sunsets.
After the vote on the conference agreement, for example, Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison
was quoted as saying that "'Nile reason we have to sunset some of these taxes is because
we had to fit within an artificial constraint of $350 billion.'" David Firestone, With Tax Cut
Bill Passed, Republicans Call for More, N.Y. Tudas, May 24, 2003, at Al2 (quoting Sen. Kay
Bailey Hutchison). Such claims are at least somewhat disingenuous. In recent years, Presi-
dent Bush and Republican congressional leaders have chosen to push through tax cuts
under the protection of the reconciliation rules. Reconciliation legislation cannot be sub-
ject to filibuster in the Senate and therefore requires only fifty-one votes to enact. The cost
of undertaking this expedited procedure is that policy actions that lose revenue outside
the budget window require sixty votes, assuming a point of order is raised against the legis-
lation under the Byrd rule. But the sunset in the conference agreement occurs much ear-
lier than would be required to satisfy the Byrd rule. President Bush and his allies in Con-
gress could have chosen instead to legislate tax changes outside the reconciliation process,
in which case the $350 billion cap would not have applied. Legislation outside the recon-
ciliation process would be subject to filibuster, but only requires fifty-one votes even for a
permanent tax cut, Put differently, tax cut advocates made a deliberate choice to use the
reconciliation process to push through tax cuts with only a slim majority in support of
them. See generally Michael W. Evans, The Budget Process and the "Sunset" Provision of the 2001
Tax Law, 99 TAX Novas 405 (2003) (discussing the Byrd rule and reconciliation).
7s Mark Wegner & Richard E. Cohen, Hastert Salutes "Trillion-Dollar" Tax Bill, Looks Tb
Medicare Debate, CONGRESSDAILY, May 23, 2003 (a.m.), 2003 WL 19999065 (alteration in
original) (quoting Speaker of the House of Representatives Dennis Hastert).
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sets, the political model probably captures important future dynamics;
after all, some of the provisions that would be most expensive to ex-
tend—repeal of the estate tax, the reductions in the top marginal in-
come tax rates, and the bonus depreciation provisions—benefit rela-
tively narrow slices of the population who happen to be both
extremely affluent and politically connected.
III. DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS
A central issue in any tax reform is who wins and who loses. Both
the optimal degree of redistribution and the best way to measure such
redistribution are controversial. In this Part, we discuss alternative
measures of the redistributive impact of tax changes and provide evi-
dence on the impact of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, if they are made
permanent. We show that the tax cuts will increase the disparity in
after-tax income. When the financing of the tax cuts is taken into con-
sideration, all of the measures point to the conclusion that the tax
cuts will make high-income households better off at the expense of all
other households.
Likewise, although advocates routinely describe the tax cuts as
pro-family and pro-small business, we show that most families (that is,
families with children) and most taxpayers with small business income
will be worse off once the financing is included. Even if the tax cuts
raise economic growth by a significant amount (relative to existing
estimates of the growth effects), most households will end up worse
off after the tax cuts, the growth effect, and the financing are consid-
ered than they would have been if the tax cuts had not taken place.
Incorporating the eventual financing of the tax cut into the dis-
tributional analysis is a key innovation in the analysis. It is consistent
with the fact that the tax cuts must be paid for eventually with either
spending cuts or other tax increases. It is consistent with the differen-
tial (revenue-neutral) incidence analysis that is the standard in aca-
demic treatments of tax incidence. And it makes moot the distracting
and misleading debates regarding which of a variety of distributional
measures are most appropriate: in analyses that ignore financing, the
alternative measures give different results, but when plausible meth-
ods of financing are included, all of the measures yield the same
qualitative results.
A. Measuring the Distribution of Tax Changes
Our preferred measure of the distributional impact of a tax
change is the percentage change in income after adjusting for all fed-
2004]	 Economic Assessment of Bush Administration Tax Policy	 1187
eral taxes and accounting for the financing of the tax cut. 79 A tax
change that gives everyone the same percentage change in take-home
income (after controlling for the financing) is, in our view, distribu-
tionally neutral—it holds the distribution of after-tax income constant
before and after the policy change. This choice emphasizes three cru-
cial issues for developing sensible and robust estimates of the distribu-
tion of tax changes.
First, the financing of the tax cut should be included in the
analysis because tax cuts eventually have to be paid for (and because
we focus on long-run effects). Measures that ignore the need to
finance a tax cut can create the misleading impression that everyone
is made better off because the direct tax-cut benefits are included but
the costs are ignored. As we show below, alternative measures of dis-
tributional benefits that yield seemingly contradictory conclusions
when financing is ignored yield consistent conclusions when financ-
ing is included. 8°
Second, our preferred measure focuses on percentage changes in
after-tax income rather than on taxes per se. Measures like the per-
centage change in tax payments (emphasized by Professor Harvey
Rosen) 81 and changes in the share of income tax payments (empha-
sized by the Office of Management and Budget) 82 can generate non-
sensical results, especially if financing is not included in the analysis, if
sonic households have very small tax payments, no tax payments, or
negative net taxes.83 Likewise, if tax and spending options are to be
compared, simply looking at the percentage change in taxes paid or
the change in share of income taxes paid will not prove informative.
When tax policies change income levels, a measure of changes in the
79 See generally JULIE-ANNE CRONIN, U.S. TREASURY DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS METH-
ODOLOGY (Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, OTA Paper No. 85, 1999),
available at http://www.treas.gov/ota/ota85.pdf; Jane G. Gravelle, Economic Issues Affecting
Across-the-Board Tax Cuts, 90 TAX Norrs 367 (2001).
813 See infra Part 111.B—C.
81 Rosen, supra note 53.
52 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 12.
83
 For example, consider a two-person economy in which one person earns $30,000
and pays $1 in taxes, and the other earns $40 million and pays $20 million in taxes. Now
consider a tax cut that reduces the first person's taxes to zero and the second person's to
$10 million. Focusing on percentage changes in taxes or in share of taxes paid would re-
quire concluding that the first person got a bigger tax cut. Likewise, raising the first per-
son's taxes from zero to $1 would be considered a bigger tax increase than raising the
second person's taxes from $10 million to $20 million or to any other finite number. Draw-
ing these conclusions about the tax cut, however, would be nonsensical. It is also unclear
how to deal with households that pay negative net taxes (because, for example, they re-
ceive refundable credits) using these approaches.
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level or share of taxes paid could actually give the wrong sign for
which taxpayers are better off. In sharp contrast, measures that focus
on the percentage change in after-tax income generate sensible re-
sults in all of the situations above.
Third, our measure includes a wide range of federal taxes, in-
cluding those on individual and corporate income, payroll, and es-
tates. We show below that including only one tax can lead to mislead-
ing results, at least when financing is ignored. 84
Although we emphasize the importance of controlling for the
financing of tax cuts in distributional analysis, we first report results
without including financing. These results are comparable to those in
most recent public discussions of these issues. 85
B. Distributional Effects Ignoring Financing
To measure distributional effects, we use the TPC micro-
simulation model. The model combines data from a public-use file of
income tax returns and demographic information from the Current
Population Survey to estimate the distribution of income, existing
taxes, and proposed changes. The model employs the tax filing unit
as the unit of analysis, and classifies the units by various measures of
current income. The model's incidence assumptions and the result-
ing distribution of tax burdens are similar to those in models used by
the Treasury Department, the CBO, and the JCT. In the TPC model,
the burden of the income tax is assigned to the payer. The corporate
income tax is borne in proportion to capital income received. The
worker bears the burden of both the employer and employee portions
of the payroll tax. The estate tax is assigned to decedents.
Table 6 reports a variety of distributional results for 2010, all of
which exclude the financing of the tax cuts. If the 2001 and 2003 tax
cuts are made permanent and the number of AMT taxpayers is held
at levels that would have prevailed under pre-EGTRRA law, about 73%
of tax filing units would receive a direct tax cut in 2010, with the share
rising from only 16% of units in the bottom quintile to more than
99% in the top quintile.
The percentage change in after-tax income would rise as income
rises, from 0.3% in the bottom quintile to 4.3% in the top quintile. It
rises even further within the top quintile, with a 6.4% increase for the
top 1% and a 7.5% increase for tax filing units in the top 0.1%. Thus,
84 See infra Part III.B.
B5 See generally, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 34.
20041	 Economic Assessment of Bush Administration Tax Policy 	 1189
the tax cuts would raise after-tax income by a greater percentage for
high-income households than for all others.
Several other commonly used measures of the distributional ef-
fects also suggest that making the tax cuts permanent would be tilted
toward high-income households in general and households in the top
1% in particular. The average tax rate fell more for the top 1% than
for any other group. Their share of the tax cut (73%) exceeded their
share of tax burdens under pre-EGTRRA (71.7%, not shown). As a
result, their share of federal taxes paid fell. The share of post-tax in-
come received would rise. The tax cut in dollars was far larger for
high-income groups than low-income groups.
Yet at least two commonly-used measures, if taken at face value,
suggest that the tax cuts actually helped other households more than
high-income households. First, households in the top 1% would re-
ceive an 11.1% reduction in their federal tax liabilities. This is more
than the average reduction, 11%, but it is smaller than the 18.2% re-
duction in federal tax liabilities experienced by households in the
second income quintile. Second, households in the top 1% quintile
would actually pay a greater share of the income tax after the tax cuts
than before.
Thus, at first glance, the distributional results in Table 6 present
somewhat of a quandary. To be sure, the most insightful measure—
the percentage change in after-tax income—shows that the tax cuts
are regressive even without taking financing into account. Many of the
other measures also indicate that the tax cuts are skewed toward high-
income households, but some suggest the opposite.
As we show below, one way to remove the quandary is to incorpo-
rate the financing of the tax cuts in the analysis. 86 When plausible
methods of financing are included, the apparent contradictions are
removed, and all of the measures show that the tax cuts are regressive.
C. Distiiinitional Effects Induding Finandng 87
The 2001 and 2003 tax cuts will be financed in the future by
some combination of tax increases and spending cuts, but there is un-
certainty over the exact programmatic changes to be employed. As a
result, we examine two hypothetical scenarios. In both scenarios, the
86 See infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
H7
 This Section is based in part on William Gale et al., Distribution of the 2001 and 2003
Tax Cuts and Their Financing, 103 TAX NOTES 1539 (2004).
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financing is set so that the annual costs of the tax cuts would be fully
paid in that year.
The first scenario assumes that each household pays the same
dollar amount to finance the tax cuts. Under this scenario, each
household receives a direct tax cut based on the 2001 and 2003 Acts
(and the AMT adjustment), but it also "pays" $1869 per tax unit (in
2010 dollars) in some combination of reductions in benefits from
government spending or increases in other taxes. Something close to
this scenario could occur if the tax cuts were financed largely or en-
tirely through spending cuts. We refer to this as "lump-sum" or "equal-
dollar" financing, with results presented in Table 7. It is the equivalent
of the hypothetical lump-sum tax that is used in differential incidence
analysis in standard academic research.
The second scenario assumes each household pays the same per-
centage of income to finance the tax cuts. In this case, each house-
hold receives a direct tax cut based on the 2001 and 2003 Acts, but
also pays 2.6% of its income each year. Something close to this sce-
nario could occur if the tax cuts were financed through a combina-
tion of spending cuts and progressive tax increases. We refer to this as
"proportional financing," with results presented in Table 9.
Under equal-dollar financing, every measure of the distributional
effects shows that high-income taxpayers would gain and all other tax-
payer groups would lose if the tax cuts were made permanent. Overall,
more than three-quarters of taxpayers are made worse off by the tax
cuts plus equal-dollar financing, including almost every household in
the bottom 40% of the income distribution, 94% in the middle quin-
tile, and even 80% in the fourth quintile. In sharp contrast, 89% of tax-
payers in the top quintile and 95% of households in the top 1% end up
better off. The percentage change in after-tax income is negative for all
groups below the top quintile and positive for the top quintile. Al-
though 76% of households would face net tax increases (or spending
cuts), households in the top 1% would receive average benefits of more
than $54,000, All of the other distributional measures show similar pat-
terns, including the two metrics that showed different results when
financing was ignored. When the financing was ignored (Table 6),
households in the second quintile had substantial cuts in federal taxes,
and high-income households had more modest cuts. When equal-
dollar financing is included, however, households in the second quin-
tile (and all of the bottom four quintiles) have net tax increases, with
enormous net tax increases facing the bottom of the distribution. In
contrast households in the top quintile have net tax cuts.
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The last column of Table 7 shows the change in the "income tax"
where it is assumed that the financing occurs through the income tax.
(This is the only way to incorporate financing into the measure that
looks only at the income tax.) Again, the difference from Table 6 is
stark. When the financing costs are ignored, high-income households
pay a greater share of the income tax after the tax cuts have been en-
acted. But when financing is included, all of the other groups pay a
higher share of the income tax and high-income groups pay a smaller
share of the income tax (plus financing) than they would have paid in
the absence of the tax cuts. The final column shows the aggregate
transfers made across income groups. All groups in the lower 80% of
the income distribution transfer resources to the top quintile.
Distributional effects that incorporate proportional financing
yield similar results (Table 8). In particular, all of the measures indi-
cate that high-income households benefit at the expense of other
households, which lose in aggregate. About 80% of households would
be worse off under the tax cuts plus proportional financing than they
would be without the tax cuts, including a majority in every quintile.
The percentage of tax units with a tax cut rises with income. The top
quintile is the only group to receive a net tax cut, but even in the top
quintile, almost two-thirds of all households in the 80th to 99th per-
centile face net tax increases. BOth of the measures that gave anoma-
lous results when financing was ignored—the percentage change in
federal taxes and the share of income tax paid—now show that
households in the bottom 80% of the income distribution are worse
off on average, while those in the top quintile are better off.
Distributional analyses also can examine the status of particular
groups defined by characteristics other than current income. For ex-
ample, the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts are often described as "pro-family"
because they expanded the child credit and reduced marriage penal-
ties. Controlling for income level, taxpayers with children received
larger direct tax cuts than those without children. 88 About 61% of
families with children would be worse off if the tax cuts were made
permanent, including 96% of those families in the lowest 40% of the
overall income distribution and between 60% and 80% of the families
in the third and fourth quintiles. Only in the top quintile would a ma-
jority of families with children be better off. Under proportional
88 See generally William G. Gale & Laurence Kotlikoff, Effects of Recent Fiscal Policies on
Today's Children and Future Generations, 103 Tax Naas 1281 (2004).
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financing, 56% of families with children would be worse off if the tax
cuts were made permanent239
A second group that has attracted significant attention in recent
tax-cut debates includes small businesses, with the tax cuts being de-
scribed as pro-entrepreneur. In its analyses of this issue, the Bush ad-
ministration has defined any tax return with Schedule C, E, or F in-
come as a small business. We adopt the same definition here,
although we recognize its flaws.9° In the aggregate, taxpayers with
business income would receive net tax cuts, even after financing, but
most individual taxpayers with business income would see their bur-
dens rise.91
 Under proportional financing, 72% of tax filers with busi-
ness income would be worse off, including more than 60% in the top
quintile, and even 37% in the top 1% of the income distribution. Un-
der lump-sum financing, those figures are lower, but even so, a major-
ity (58%) of all tax filers with business income would be worse off,
including almost all of those filers in the bottom 40% of the income
distribution.
iv. LONG-TERM ECONOMIC GROWTH
A central goal of the recent tax policies, embodied in the titles of
the 2001 and 2003 Acts, was to raise economic growth. 92 The net effect
of the tax cuts on growth is theoretically uncertain. Although lower tax
rates can encourage work and saving, lower tax levels encourage leisure
and consumption, and budget deficits reduce national saving. Several
studies have estimated the net effects in different ways with different
models, yet all have come to the same conclusion: making the tax cuts
permanent is likely to reduce, not increase, national income in the
long term unless the reduction in revenues is matched by an equal re-
duction in government consumption. And even in that case, a positive
impact on long-term growth occurs only if the spending cuts occur con-
temporaneously, which has decidedly not occurred, or if models with
implausible features are employed.
99
 For further discussion, see generally id.
See generally Leonard Burman et al., Thinking Through the Tax Options, 99 TAx NoTrs
1081 (2003).
91 A subsequent Part of this Article examines the effects on economic growth and dis-
cusses the effects of the tax cuts on incentives for entrepreneurial entry and investment.
See infra n otes 92-154 and accompanying text.
92
 Tax policy can affect the economy's underlying growth rate, create a one-time shift
in the level of economic activity, or both. Both effects change the size of the future econ-
omy and will be considered to imply an effect of taxes on economic growth.
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A. Taxes and Growth: Channels of Influence
Over the long term, tax cuts influence the economy through
several channels. First, they affect the behavior of individuals and
businesses. The positive effects of tax cuts on growth arise because
lower marginal tax rates raise the reward for working, saving, and in-
vesting. Holding real income constant, these lower marginal rates in-
duce more work effort, saving, and investment through substitution
effects. This is typically the "intended" effect of tax cuts on growth,
and it is certainly the effect that is emphasized by advocates of tax
cuts. It is by no means the only effect, however, nor is it necessarily the
largest effect.
Tax cuts may also provide positive income (or wealth) effects,
which reduce the need to work, save, and invest. An across-the-board
cut in income tax rates, for example, incorporates both effects. It.
raises the marginal return to work, which raises labor supply through
the substitution effect, and it also raises a household's after-tax in-
come at every level of labor supply, which reduces labor supply
through the income effect. The net effect on labor supply is ambigu-
ous. Similar effects also apply to saving.
Tax cuts or well-designed reforms may also reduce the extent to
which taxpayers legally avoid and illegally evade taxes. This can im-
prove the allocation of resources and hence raise economic growth
even without increasing the level of labor and capital inputs.
Besides their effects on private agents, tax cuts also affect the
economy through changes in federal finances. In the absence of other
policy changes, tax cuts are likely to raise the federal budget deficit,
which in turn is likely to reduce national saving, and hence the capital
stock owned by Americans and future national income. The increase
in the deficit is also likely to raise interest rates. These changes—lower
national saving and the associated increase in interest rates—create a
fiscal drag on the economy's ability to grow. Eventually, though, any
permanent tax cut must be financed by some combination of future
spending cuts or future tax increases, and those policy changes will
influence the effect of the original tax cut on economic growth. Be-
cause fiscally unsustainable policies cannot be maintained forever, the
future financing of a tax cut must be incorporated into analyses of the
effect of the tax cut itself.
Federal tax cuts can also generate responses from other govern-
mental entities, including the central bank, state governments, and
foreign governments. In particular, the potential responses of foreign
governments often are overlooked. Cuts in U.S. taxes that induce
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capital inflows from abroad, for example, may encourage other coun-
tries to reduce their taxes to retain capital or attract U.S. funds. To
the extent that other countries respond, the net effect of capital in-
come tax cuts on growth will be smaller than otherwise.
In summary, although there is no doubt that tax policy can influ-
ence the economy, it is by no means obvious that a tax cut will ulti-
mately lead to a larger economy. A fair assessment would conclude
that well-designed tax policies can raise growth, but there are many
stumbling blocks along the way and there is certainly no guarantee
that all tax cuts will improve economic performance.
B. Were the 2001 and 2003 Tax Cuts Well Designed for Growth?
Given the various channels through which tax policy affects
growth, a growth-inducing tax cut would involve (1) minimal in-
creases in the budget deficit to avoid the long-term fiscal drag created
by lower national saving and higher interest rates, and (2) a pattern of
substitution and income effects to encourage an increased supply of
labor and capital and reduced consumption, including the careful
targeting of tax cuts on new economic activity, rather than the provi-
sion windfall gains for previous activities. The 2001 and 2003 tax cuts
score poorly on both criteria.
1. Deficits
If the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts are made permanent (and the AMT
is adjusted so that the number of people on the AMT in each year is
the same under the extended tax cuts as it would have been in that
year under pre-2001 law), the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts will increase the
federal debt by $4.4 trillion in 2014, or by 24% of GDP in that year.
This will reduce income and raise interest rates significantly in that
year and future years and hence will make the environment for long-
term growth more difficult.
To calibrate the effect on national income, note that President
Bush's Council of Economic Advisers ("CEA") reports that `tone dollar
of [public] debt reduces the [domestic] capital stock by about 60
cents."9s The CEA calculations imply that the domestic capital stock
will fall by $2.6 trillion by 2014 because of the deterioration in the fis-
cal outlook attributable to the tax cuts if they are extended, even
93 COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 58 box 1-4
(2003), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudgetify04/pdf/2003_erp.pdf.
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without taking into account the greater foreign ownership of that
capital. If the return to capital is 6%, then in 2015, GDP will be $156
billion lower than it otherwise would have been, or about 0.8% of pro-
jected GDP, because of the effects of the tax cut on the deficit." More
importantly, because private saving plausibly would offset perhaps
one-quarter of the increase in public debt, 95 the capital stock owned
by Americans would decline by $3.3 trillion (75% of the $4.4 trillion
in additional public debt), so that national income in 2015 would be
almost $200 billion lower (slightly more than 1% of projected GDP).
This translates into a cost of more than $1000 per household in that
year alone and would continue indefinitely.
To calibrate the effect of the deficits on interest rates, note that
recent estimates imply that an increase in the ratio of the public debt to
GDP by 1 percentage point would raise real interest rates by 3 basis
points. 95 If so, the deficits created by the 2001 and 2003 tax cttts, if they
are made permanent (and the AMT is adjusted), would raise interest
rates by 72 basis points in 2014 and reduce investment. Our own esti-
mates find that real long-term interest rates would rise by between 44
and 67 basis points per percent of GDP in increased primary deficits. 97
Because making the tax cuts permanent would raise the primary deficit
by about 2% of GDP, our findings suggest that the impact on interest
rates would be somewhere between 80 and 130 basis points.
Notably, the adverse effects of the accumulated public debt on
national saving and interest rates would persist in the years after 2014.
As a result, the deficits created by the tax cuts create both a drag on
future growth prospects, and a large hurdle for the tax cuts to over-
94 See generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 34.
95 For example, the CBO concludes that private saving would rise by between 20% and
50% of an increase in the deficit. See generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, DESCRIPTION OF ECO-
NOMIC MODELS (1998), available at http://cho.gov/ftpdocs/10xx/doc1046/econmdls.pdf
(last modified Nov. 20, 1998). Douglas Elmendorf and Jeffrey Liebman conclude that pri-
vate saving would offset 25% of an increase in the deficit. Sec generally Douglas W. Elmen-
dorf & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Social Security Reform. and National Saving in an Era of Budget Sur-
pluses, in 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY l (William C. Brainard & George L.
Perry eds., 2000). William Gale and Samara Potter estimate that private saving will offset
31% of the decline in public saving caused by the 2001 cut. See generally Gale & Potter, su-
pra note 47.
" See generally ERIC M. ENGEN & R. GLENN FlUBBARD, FEDERAL. GOVERNMENT DEBT
AND INTEREST RATES (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10681, 2004).
97 Sec generally William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, Budget Deficits, National Saving, and
Interest Rates (Sept. 2004) (forthcoming in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. Activrry), avail-
able at http://www.brookings.edu/es/commentary/journals/bpea_macro/forum/090704
orszag.pdf (last modified Sept. 7, 2004).
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come in order to raise economic growth. Unfortunately, the tax cuts
are not well-designed to overcome these obstacles.
2. Income and Substitution Effects
The effects of the tax cuts on marginal tax rates are surprisingly
small. Using the Treasury Department's tax model, the 2001 tax cut,
when fully phased in, will provide no reduction in marginal tax rates
for 76% of tax filing units (including non-filers) and 72% of filers,
and 64% of those with positive tax liability would receive no reduction
in marginal tax rates. 98
 These taxpayers account for 38% of all taxable
income. The marginal tax rate on taxable wages, interest, dividends,
and sole proprietorship income fell by between 1.6 and 2.4 percent-
age points.99
 The economy-wide reduction in taxes on capital income,
however, is likely to be significantly smaller, because a substantial
share of such income flows to non-taxable entities, such as pension
funds and non-profits. For example, the CBO found economy-wide
declines of just 0.5 percentage points for capital income and 1.6 per-
centage points for wage incomeP9 Our calculations using the TPC
microsimulation model indicate that, if both the 2001 and 2003 tax
cuts were made permanent (with the AMT adjustment noted above),
60% of filers, who collectively represent more than 40% of taxpayers
and report 30% of all taxable income, would not see a reduction in
marginal tax rates, relative to pre-EGTRRA law.'°' Households that do
not receive reductions in marginal tax rates are typically either on the
AMT or in the 15% bracket. This suggests that the positive incentives
from the tax cuts on labor supply, saving, investment, and so on are
likely to be limited.
In addition to modest incentive effects, the tax cuts also created
positive income effects that will reduce labor supply, saving, and in-
vestment. First, the creation of the new 10% bracket, and the expan-
sion of the child credit generate positive income effects for all income
tax payers with children, and the marriage penalty relief provisions
generate positive income effects for many married taxpayers. Calcula-
tions using the TPC microsimulation model indicate that if the tax
cuts were made permanent (and the AMT adjusted), 44% (50 mil-
98 See generally Donald Keifer et al., The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act
of 2001: Overview and Assessment of Effects an Taxpayers, 55 NAT'L TAX J. 89 (2002).
99 See generally id.
100 See generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 44.
tar See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
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lion) of all filers with an income tax cut, representing 34% of taxable
income, would receive a net tax cut but would not receive a reduction
in marginal tax rates on wages. Of these, 7.7 million filers actually face
increases in marginal tax rates. All of these households would receive
positive income effects (higher after-tax income), but either no substi-
tution effect or a negative substitution effect. For all of these house-
holds, the tax cuts would likely reduce labor supply.
Second, besides creating positive income effects, but not substitu-
tion effects, for many taxpayers and besides not reducing marginal tax
rates substantially, the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts did not do a good job of
targeting new investment. The key issue is that the reductions in divi-
dend and capital gains taxes reward not only new investment, but also
the returns to old investment. Hence, much of their potential impact
on growth is diluted by providing windfall gains to owners of existing
capital. 102
In summary, although the recent tax acts reduce marginal tax
rates, they also contain many significant anti-growth features. They
create large deficits, which burden the economy with lower national
saving and higher interest rates. They provide small reductions in
marginal tax rates, especially on capital income, blunting the poten-
tial positive incentive effects. They create positive income effects, but
no substitution effects, for a substantial number of taxpayers, which
actively discourages labor supply and saving. They create windfall
gains for the owners of old capital, which further discourages produc-
tive supply-side responses.
C. Aggregate Analyses
Formal analyses confirm the intuition developed above that the
tax cuts are poorly designed to stimulate long-term growth. 105 Professor
Auerbach uses an overlapping generations life-cycle model to examine
the long-term effects of the 2001 tax cuts, noting that they must even-
tually be financed with either tax increases or spending cuts.'" He
1 " For example, studies of the effects of consumption taxes on growth show that
whether a windfall gain is provided to owners of existing capital in the transition to a new
system has.a very large impact on the effects of tax reform on long-term growth. See gener-
ally, e.g., David Altig et al., Simulating Fundamental Tax Reform in the United States, 91 Am.
ECON. REV. 574 (2001).
I" Sec supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text.
104 See generally ALAN J. AUERBACH, THE BUSH TAx CUT AND NATIONAL SAVING (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9012, 2002). The mode! was developed in
ALAN. AUERBACII & LAURENCE]. KOTLIKOFF, DYNAMIC FISCAL POLICY (1987).
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shows that the long-term effects on the size of the economy depend on
when the financing begins and what form the financing takes. If the
financing begins after ten, fifteen, or twenty years and takes the form of
increased wage taxes or capital taxes, the net effect will be to reduce
the long-term size of the economy. After twenty years, the economy is
smaller under each of these scenarios by between 0.4% and 1.2%. In
the long term (about 150 years), the decline in the size of the economy
ranges between about 0.6% and more than 2%.
The tax cuts could also be financed with spending cuts. Professor
Auerbach shows that if the entire tax cut is financed by immediate re-
ductions in government consumption—so that the tax cut does not
create any deficits to begin with and does not reduce government in-
vestments in, say, health, human capital, or infrastructure—the tax cut
does raise the long-term capital stock per capita, but the long-term
increase is just 0.5%. 105 If only half of the tax cuts are financed imme-
diately upon enactment with reductions in government consumption,
and the remaining shortfall is made up beginning ten years after en-
actment with capital income taxes, however, the long-term capital
stock per capita is lower than it would have been in the absence of the
tax cuts. 100
 Because it seems clear that reductions in government con-
sumption over the last few years did not finance the tax cuts (because
such reductions did not occur), Professor Auerbach's analysis implies
strongly that the impact on long-term growth will be negative.i°7
Two other studies use large macroeconometric models to exam-
ine the long-term effects of the tax cuts. 108
 Douglas W. Elmendorf and
David L. Reifschneider use a rational-expectations, open-economy
model based on the Federal Reserve Board ("FRB") model of the
economy. 309
 Although their main focus is on the short-term effects of
tax cuts, they also show that their model implies that a sustained cut
in personal income tax rates would reduce the long-term size of the
105 See generally AUERBACH, supra note 104.
100
 See generally id,
107 See generally id.
108
 Christopher L. House and Matthew D. Shapiro provide an interesting analysis of
how the tax cuts might have had stronger short-term effects if they had been phased in
more quickly, but their analysis assumes every tax change is financed by changes in lump-
sum taxation, and so it does not address the long-term effects of the deficits that would be
created by making the tax cuts permanent. See generally CHRISTOPHER L. HOUSE & MA•-
THEW D. SHAPIRO, PHASED-IN TAX CUTS AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 10415, 2004).
109 See generally Douglas W. Elmendorf Be David L. Reifschneider, Short-Run Effects of Fis-
cal Policy with Forward-Looking Financial Markets, 55 NAT'L tut J. 357 (2002).
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economy relative to the baseline. A recent analysis reaches similarly
pessimistic conclusions about the long-term effects of making the tax
cuts permanent. 1i°
The most comprehensive aggregate analysis of the long-term ef-
• fects of tax cuts was undertaken by twelve economists at the CB0. 111
This study examines the effects of a generic 10% statutory reduction
in all income tax rates, including those applying to dividends, capital
gains, and the AMT. Although the authors do not examine the 2001
and 2003 tax cuts per se, the study is quite useful for evaluating mak-
ing the tax cuts permanent. In particular, because the CBO study fo-
cuses on "pure" rate cuts, rather than on the panoply of additional
credits and subsidies enacted in EGTRRA, the growth effects reported
probably overstate the impact of making the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts
permanent. In the tax cut they examine the following: (1) euery tax-
payer receives a reduction in marginal tax rates, so 100% of taxable
income is affected, as opposed to 62%, for example, under EGTRRA,
as discussed above; and (2) there are no positive income effects from
provisions other than marginal tax rate cuts, again unlike EGTRRA
and JGTRRA. 112 As the study states, "the reduction in marginal tax
rates is large compared with the overall budget cost." 113
The study uses three different models to examine the long-term
effects: a closed-economy overlapping generations ("OLG") model,
an open-economy OLG model, and the Ramsey model. The authors
t
no Sec Mark M. Zandi, Asseising President Bush's Fiscal Policies, DISMAL SCIENTIST, July
2004, at 7, 9, available	 hup://www.econorny.com/dismal/economycom_bushfiscal
policy.pdf. Doctor Mark M. ZOnai stated the following:
::	 •	 •Optimism that if the President's Lox cuts are made permanent that they
would create powerful, inLentives for more investment and harder work and
thus ultimately more tax' revenues and an improving long-term fiscal situation
is misplaced....
Deficits of the size that would ensue if the tax cuts are made permanent
will have serious negative long-term economic implications.. .
Investment, productivity growth, and ultimately the nation's living stan-
dards would all be measurably weaker, and a more substantive fiscal crisis
would eventually ensue..
Id.
111 See generally ROBERT DENNIS ET AL., MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS Or A 10 PERCENT
CUT IN INCOME TAX RATES (Cong. Budget Office, Technical Paper No. 2004-07, 2004),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/54xx/doc5485/2004-07.pdf (last modified May
27, 2004).
See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
Hs DENNIS ET AL., supra note 111, at 8.
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assume that the tax cuts are financed either by reductions in govern-
ment consumption or by increases in tax rates. In either case, the
financing begins after ten years and increases gradually for another
ten years and then is stabilized. Thus, deficits are allowed to build for
the first decade of the tax cut and much of the second decade as well.
The results are reported in Table 9. 114 In the three scenarios in
which the tax cuts are financed by increases in income taxes, the long-
term effects generally are negative. In the Ramsey model and the
closed-economy OLG model, GDP and gross national product
("GNP") fall significantly. In the open-economy OLG model, GDP
rises slightly (0.2%), but GNP falls by even more than in the other
models. The open-economy results occur because tax cuts reduce na-
tional saving and hence increase capital inflows. The inflow, in con-
junction with increased labor supply, is sufficient to raise the output
produced on American soil slightly. The capital inflows, however,
must eventually be repaid and doing so reduces GNP, even though
GDP rises. Ultimately, of course, future living standards of Americans
depend on GNP, not GDP." 5
In the three scenarios in which the tax cuts are financed with cuts
in government consumption, the effects are less negative. In the closed-
economy OLG model, there is virtually no effect on growth. In the
open-economy OLG model, GDP rises by 0.5% in the long-run, but
GNP falls by 0.4%. 116 The sole case that is uniformly positive for growth
occurs when (1) the tax cuts are financed by reductions in government
purchases, and (2) the policy is run through the Ramsey model, in
which case long-term GDP would rise by about 0.8%. As the authors
note, however, the Ramsey model implies that the reduction in gov-
ernment saving due to the tax cuts in the first decade is matched one-
for-one with increases in private saving.'" Empirical evidence rejects
114 We thank David Weiner and Robert Dennis for providing the gross national prod-
uct results, which are not provided in the report.
" 5 See generally Douglas W. Elmendorf & N. Gregory Mankiw, Government Debt, in IC
HANDBOOK Or MACROECONOMICS 1615 (John B. Taylor & Michael Woodford eds., 1999).
116 These findings are consistent with CBO Director Douglas Holtz-Eakin's statement
that the net effect of the tax cut on long-term growth would be "'modestly negative.'"
Timothy Casts, Congress Prepares for Looming Budget Season, 102 TAx NO•l'ES 559, 559 (2004)
(quoting CBO Director Douglas Holtz-Eakin); see Edmund Andrews, Budget Office Forecasts
Record Deficit in V4 and Sketches a Pessimistic Future, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2004, at A21; Jona-
thon Weisman, CBO Says '04 Deficit Will Rise to $977 Billion; Extending Tax Cuts Could Double
Debt, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2004, at A01.
117 DENNIS ET AL., supra note 111, at 9.
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this view.'" In addition, if this result did hold, it would imply that
households did not spend any of their tax cuts in 2001. 2002, and 2003,
a proposition that has been rejected in recent analysis. 119
D. "Bottom up" or Sectoral Analyses
"Bottom up" analysesm obtain estimates of the growth effects of
tax cuts by examining the effects on each sector and summing the
effects. These studies also offer the chance to focus on particular sec-
tors of the economy.
1. Lower National Saving Versus Better Incentives
Our previous work in this area has concluded that the 2001 tax
cuts would generate negative effects on long-term growth. Peter Or-
szag used estimates from Jonathan Gruber and Emmanuel Saez on
the elasticity of "broad" income, a concept similar to national income,
with respect to marginal tax rates.' 21 That elasticity suggested a posi-
tive effect of 0.4 to 0.5 percentage points in 2012 from the reduced
marginal tax rates contained in an early version of the 2001 tax cut.
Ila See Gale & Orszag, supra note 97. Besides the studies noted in the text, a number of
studies have examined the effects of the tax as legislated, as opposed to permanent tax
cuts. The CBO has found the following:
The revenue measures enacted since 2001 will boost labor supply by be-
tween 0.4 and 0.6 percent from 2004 to 2008 and up to 0.2 percent in 2009 to
2013....
But the tax legislation will probably have a net negative effect on saving,
investment, and capital accumulation over the next 10 years....
The tax laws' net effect on potential output ... will probably be negative
in the second five years.
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: AN UPDATE 45 (2003),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/44xx/doc4493/08-26-Report.pdf (last modified
Aug. 25, 2003), The JCT estimated that a plan very similar to the 2003 tax cut would boost
GDP in the short run, but would end up reducing GDP relative to the baseline in the second
half of the decade. See generally JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATED BUDGET EFF'EC'TS OF
THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR H.R. 2, supra note 8. Although the JGT does not report
results beyond the ten-year window, the language implies that the growth effect would con-
tinue to decline. See generally Burman et al., supra note 90.
119 DAVID S. JOHNSON ET AL., HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE AND THE INCOME TAX RE
BATES OF 2001 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10784, 2004).
126 The terminology is from Slemrod, supra note 71.
191 See generally JON GRUBER & EMMANUEL SAEZ, Tux ELASTICITY OF TAXABLE INCOME:
EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7512,
2000); PETER R. ORSZAG, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, MARGINAL TAX RATE
REDUCTIONS AND THE ECONOMY: WHAT WOULD BE THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF THE BUSH
TAX Ctn.? (Mar. 16, 2001), available at http://www.cbpp.org/3-15-01tax.pdf.
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Doctor Orszag then compared that positive effect to the negative ef-
fect on future national income from the reduced national saving asso-
ciated with the deficit-financing of the tax cut. He concluded that the
net effect was likely to be a small reduction, of 0.1 to 0.5 percentage
points, in national income in 2012.
William Gale and Samara Potter estimate the long-term effects of
making the 2001 tax cut permanent. 122
 They combine estimates of the
changes in incentives provided by the tax cut with estimates of how
tax incentives affect saving, investment, labor supply, and human capi-
tal accumulation. They find that these "supply side" effects will raise
the size of the economy by almost 1% by 2011. As noted above, how-
ever, the supply-side effects are not the only channel through which
the tax cuts will operate. 123
 William Gale and Samara Potter also esti-
mate that the increase in the deficit, due to the tax cuts, will reduce
national saving, and the reduction will cause GDP to decline by about
1.6% by 2011. After allowing for capital inflows, based on historical
relationships, they estimate that the net effect would be to reduce
GDP by about 0.3% by 2011 and reduce GNP by 0.7%. 124
An important earlier study estimates that a generic 5 percentage
point reduction in marginal tax rates would raise annual growth rates
by 0.2 to 0.3 percentage points for a decade. 125 This calculation is of-
ten invoked by supporters of the Bush administration's tax cuts, 126 but
it is entirely inappropriate to apply these effects to EGTRRA and
JGTRRA. First, the tax cut that Eric M. Engen and Jonathan Skinner
examine is implicitly financed by immediate reductions in govern-
ment consumption; there is no fiscal drag created by deficits. Second,
the 5 percentage point drop in effective marginal tax rates that they
analyze is several times the size of the cut in effective economy-wide
marginal tax rates on wages and capital income induced by EGTRRA
and JGTRRA, as noted above. 127
 A tax cut that increases deficits sub-
stantially but cuts marginal rates by much less than the 5 percentage
point reduction that Doctor Engen and Professor Skinner examine is,
I" See generally Gale & Potter, supra note 47.
129 See supra Part IVA.
124 See generally Gale & Potter, supra note 47.
125
 See generally Eric Engen & Jonathan Skinner, Taxation and Economic Growth, 49 NKr'',
TAX J. 617 (1996), available at http://ntj.tax.org/wwtax/ntjrec.nsf/9365D2AID719E93
C85256863004B1F4F/VILE/v49n4617.pdf.
126 see generally, e.g., Charles W. Calomiris & Kevin A. Hassett, Marginal Tax Rate Cuts
and the Public Tax Debate, 55 NAT'L TAXI 119 (2002); Rosen, supra note 53.
127 See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
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even under the Engen-Skinner behavioral assumptions, not likely to
generate positive economic growth. 128
2. Investment and Entrepreneurship
Further insights on the growth effects of making the tax cuts
permanent can be derived from considering how making the tax cuts
permanent would affect the level of investment, the allocation of capi-
tal, and the extent of entrepreneurial activity.
Tax cuts have offsetting effects on the cost of new investments,
with marginal tax rate cuts reducing, and higher interest rates from
deficits increasing, the cost of capital. If EGTRRA were to raise inter-
est rates by 50 basis points, the cost of capital would rise for corporate
equipment and structures, non-corporate equipment and structures,
and owner-occupied housing. 129 By 2014, EGTRRA, if extended,
would increase the public debt by just over $3.4 trillion, or about 19%
of GDP in 2014. 130 This implies an interest rate increase of 57 basis
points using the Eric Engen and Glenn Hubbard estimates noted
above and larger effects using the William Gale and Peter Orszag es-
timates."' Thus, recent estimates of the impact of debt on interest
rates imply that EGTRRA will raise the cost of capital for new invest-
ments and hence reduce investment.
In more recent work, we show that the net effect of making both
EGTRRA and iGIRRA permanent would be to raise the cost of capi-
tal once the interest rate effects are taken into account.t 32 These find-
ings imply that making the tax cuts permanent would reduce the
long-term level of investment.
Normally, less investment would imply less output. Making the
tax cuts permanent, however, would likely improve the long-term allo-
cation. of the capital stock between corporate and non-corporate uses,
which would raise output even with the same or lower level of invest-
ment. In particular, the dividend and capital gains reductions could
128 See generally Gale Sc Potter, supra note 47 (providing additional discussion of the Eric
Engen and Jonathan Skinner results and differences between the tax cuts they analyze and
the recent tax changes).
129 See generally id.
150 This calculation is based on JCT estimates of the effects of EGTRRA as legislated,
The TPC microsimulation model estimates of the effects of extending the tax cuts, and
debt services costs using the CBO interest rate matrix.
131 See generally ENGEN & 1-1 HARD, supra note 96; Gale & Orszag, supra note 97.
152 See generally William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, Tax Cuts, Interest Rates, and the
User Cost of Capital (n.d.) (work in progress).
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help to reduce biases in the allocation of capital by reducing the gen-
eralli higher tax imposed on capital invested in the corporate sec-
tor.' 3
 Although precise estimates are not available, even supporters of
the 2003 tax cut acknowledge that the benefits from improved alloca-
tion of capital are likely to be sma11. 154
 For example, former CEA
Chairman R. Glenn Hubbard suggested in a speech at the American
Economic Association in January 2004 that the allocative improve-
ments induced by the Bush administration's original proposal would
raise the long-term level of GDP by 0.2 percentage points.'" The divi-
dend and capital gains tax proposal that was actually enacted, how-
ever, is inferior to the original proposal because the enacted proposal
does not ensure that corporate income is taxed at least once. The al-
locative efficiency gains therefore are likely to be smaller under the
enacted tax cut than under the Bush administration's proposal. 156
Jane Gravelle and Mark M. Zandi conclude that the net benefits of
the dividend and capital gains tax cuts are likely to be quite small, if
positive at all. 157
Although tax cut supporters frequently claim that making the tax
cuts permanent would help entrepreneurs, the likely effect is more
complex. Small businesses would be doubly hurt. First, their cost of
133
 But see generally Leonard E. Burman et al., The Administration's Savings Proposals: Pre-
liminary Analysis, 98 TAX NOTES 1423 (2003) (discussing concerns about the ability of the
enacted dividend cuts to resolve the double taxation problem); William G. Gale & Peter R.
Orszag, The Administration's Proposal to Cut Dividend and Capital Gains Taxes, 20 Mx NOTES
415 (2003). For further discussion, see generally DINO FALASCHEITI & MICHAEL J. OR-
LANDO, CUTTING THE DIVIDENDS TAX ... AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE Too? (Dept. of
Econ., Wash. U. St. Louis, Fin. Working Paper No. 0311008, 2003), available at
http://econwpa.wustLedu:8089/eps/fin/papers/0311/0311008.pdf
 (providing analysis of
how the new treatment of dividends could affect corporate governance adversely) and
Jeffrey L. Rubinger, Converting Low-Taxed Income into "Qualified Dividend Income," 103 TAX
NOTES 858 (2004) (offering analysis of how the new treatment of dividends could create
new tax shelters).
1" The Council of Economic Advisors (the "CEA") suggested that under the Bush ad-
ministration's original dividend proposal, the improved efficiency would generate gains
equal to between 0.08% and 0.5% of GDP. COUNCIL. OF ECON. ADVISORS, supra note 93, at
204 (calculations from dollar amounts given by the CEA).
"5
 R. Glenn Hubbard, Presentation at the American Economic Association Meeting
(Jan. 4, 2004).
1345
 In any case, even if the 0.2% increase in long-term output—which as noted is
probably an overestimate of the effects of the actual policy adopted—is added to "bottom
up" estimates made by William Gale and Samara Potter or by Peter Orszag, the net effects
would be roughly a zero effect on long-term growth. See generally Gale & Potter, supra note
47; ORSZAG, supra note 121.
137 See generallyjane Gravelle, Effects of Dividend Relief on Economic Growth, the Stock Mar-
ket, and Corporate Tax Preferences, 56 NAIL TAX J. 653 (2003); Zandi, supra note 110.
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capital for new investments would rise because of the increase in in-
terest rates, so that their overall investment would likely decline, as
discussed above.I 38 Second, these effects would be accentuated by the
dividend tax cut, which could shift investment funds away from non-
corporate businesses, where entrepreneurs are disproportionately lo-
cated, and toward C corporations.
Other effects on self-employment and risk-taking are not as clear.
The literature does not speak with a clear view on whether lower tax
rates raise or reduce the desirability of becoming an entrepreneur.
Several studies have found that higher tax rates raise (or do not re-
duce) the likelihood of entry into self-employment and reduce (or do
not raise) the likelihood of exit from self-employment.'" William M.
Gentry and R. Glenn Hubbard estimate that increased convexity (Pro-
gressivity) in the tax structure will reduce entrepreneurial activity. 140
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 ("TRA 86") has been estimated to
have raised the investment, hiring, and income growth of small busi-
nesses. 141 This finding is difficult to apply to the effects of making the
2001 and 2003 tax cuts permanent, however, because TRA 86 involved
larger reductions in marginal tax rates and was revenue-neutral, and
so did not raise deficits, interest rates, or the cost of capital.
Julie Berry Cullen and Roger H. Gordon note several interactions
between entrepreneurial activity and tax rates, including the option
that small business owners have to incorporate in order to shelter
funds.I 42 They find that the direct tax effects of the 2001 Act reduced
self-employment by about one-sixth. They also find that cutting the
capital gains tax rate raises entrepreneurial activity, and higher interest
rates reduce such activity. A rough summary of the Gordon-Cullen ef-
138 See supra notes 129-132 and accompanying text.
1 $9 See generally WILLIAM M. GENTRY & R. GLENN HUBBARD, "SUCCESS TAXES," ENTRE-
PRENEURIAL ENTRY, AND INNOVATION (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
10551. 2004) (reviewing the literature).
140 See generally William M. Gentry & R. Glenn Hubbard, Tax Policy and Entry into En-
trepreneurship (Nov. 13, 2002) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.nber.org/—confer/
2003 /en tf03/lerner.pdf.
141 See gr.:wally ROBERT CARROLL ET AL., ENTREPRENEURS, INCOME TAXES, AND INVEST-
MENT (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6374, 2002); ROBERT CARROLL rt.
AL., INCOME TAXES AND ENTREPRENEURS' USE OF LABOR (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 6578, 1998); ROBERT CARROLL ET AL., PERSONAL INCOME TAXES AND THE
GROWTH or SMALL FIRMS (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7980, 2000).
142 See generatiyiuLtE BERRY CULLEN & ROGER H. GORDON, TAXES AND ENTREPRENEU-
RIAL ACTIVITY: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FOR THE U.S. (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research, Work-
ing Paper No. 9015, 2002).
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fects suggests that the net effects of making EGTRRA and JGTRRA
permanent would be a wash for entrepreneurial activity.
E. Other Evidence on Taxes and Growth
The argument that tax cuts raise growth is repeated so often that
analyses that show or claim the opposite are often rejected out of
hand. The earlier Sections, however, provide both the logic and the
evidence that suggests that making the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts per-
manent would probably harm long-term growth. 143 In this Section, we
present seven additional perspectives suggesting that tax cuts need
not raise economic growth and that poorly designed tax cuts could
well reduce it.
Perhaps most strikingly, historical data show huge shifts in taxes
with no observable shift in growth rates. From 1870 to 1912, the
United States had no income tax, and tax revenues were just 3% of
GDP. From 1947 to 1999, the highest income tax rate averaged 66%,
and federal revenues were about 18% of GDP. In addition, estate and
corporate taxes were imposed at high marginal rates and state taxes
rose significantly over earlier levels. Nevertheless, the growth rate of
real GDP per capita was identical in the two periods. 144 In formal tests,
Nancy L. Stokey and Sergio Rebelo find no evidence of a break in
growth patterns around World War 11 145 Obviously, many factors af-
fect economic growth rates, but if taxes were as crucial to growth as is
sometimes claimed, the large and permanent historical increases in
tax burdens and marginal tax rates might be expected to appear in
the aggregate growth statistics.
Empirical studies of the growth effects of actual U.S. tax cuts are
relatively rare, in part because the United States had only one major
tax cut between 1965 and 2000. Some scholars find that the 1981 tax
cuts had virtually no net impact on economic growth. 146 This may be
145 See supra notes 53-142 and accompanying text.
"4
 See generally William G. Gale, Notes on Taxes, Growth, and Dynamic Analysis of New Legisla-
tion, in THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN TAXATION: ESSAYS COMMEMORATING IIIE 30TH ANNIVER
SARY OF TAx NOTES 29 ( Joseph J. Thorndike ed., 2002), available at http://wwwaei.org/
docLib/20021222_conf021210d.pdf.
145 See generally Nancy L. Stokey & Sergio Rebelo, Growth Effects of Flat-Rate Taxes, 103 J.
Poi.. ECON. 519 (1995).
"6 See generally MARTIN FELDSTEIN, BUDGET DEFICITS, TAX RULES, AND REAL INTEREST
RATES (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No, 1970, 1986); Martin Feldstein
& Douglas W. Elmendorf, Budget Deficits, Tax Incentives, and Inflation: A Surprising Lesson
from the 1983-1984 Recovery, in 3 TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 1 (Lawrence H. Summers
ed., 1989).
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surprising, given the incentives created by the large marginal rate cuts
embodied in the 1981 tax cut. But the rate cuts also entailed income
effects, and the 1981 Act also increased tax sheltering activities and the
budget deficit, all of which militates toward negative effects on growth.
Cross-country studies find very small long-term effects of taxes on
growth among developed countries."' Other studies find no tax effects
on growth in developed countries. 148 Fabio Padovano and Emma Galli
find that a 10 percentage point reduction in marginal tax rates raises
the growth rate by 0.11 percentage points in Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-Operation and Development ("OECD") countries. 149 Eric
Engen and Jonathan Skinner find significant effects of taxes on growth
in a sample of 107 countries, but the tax effects are tiny and in-
significant when estimated on developed countries.'"
Simulation models offer a third approach to examining tax cuts.
A simple extrapolation based on earlier published results from the
Federal Reserve Board model of the U.S. economy implies that a cut
in income tax rates that reduces revenues by 1% of GDP will raise
GDP by 0.1% after ten years if the Federal Reserve follows a Taylor
rule for monetary policy. 181
147 For a critique of the literature, see generally Oliver Blanchard & Roberto Perotti,
An Empirical Characterization of the Dynamic Effects of Changes in Government Spending and Taxes
on Output, 117 Q). ECON. 1329 (1999) (providing additional evidence, but focusing on
short-term effects) and Slemrod, supra note 71.
145 See generally Charles B. Garrison & Feng-Yao Lee, Taxation, Agnate Activity and Eco-
nomic Growth: Further Cross-Country Evidence on Some Supply-Side Hypotheses, 30 ECON. INQUIRY
172 (1992); Enrique G. Mendoza et al., On the Ineffectiveness of Tax Policy in Altering Long-
Run Growth: Harbmgm's Superneutrality Conjecture, 661 PUBLIC ECON. 99 (1997).
149 See generally Fabio Padovano & Emma Galli, Tax Rates and Economic Growth in the
OECD Countries, 39 ECON. INQUIRY 44 (2001). Stefan FOIster and Magnus Henrekson find
no tax effects on growth in Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
("OECD") countries. See generally Stefan Holster & Magnus Henrekson, Growth Effects of
Government Expenditure and Taxation in Rich Countries, 45 EUR. ECON. REv. 1501 (2001).
When they extend the sample to include high-income, non-OECD countries, they find a
significant effect. But the regressions using tax variables do not control for spending, so it
is not clear what the tax variable is capturing.
1 " ERIC ENGEN & JONATHAN SKINNER, FISCAL POLICY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 43 tbl.4
col. 4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4223, 1992). Statistical in-
significance might be attributed to the fact that there are only twenty-one developed coun-
tries, but several of the other variables—including investment rates, initial income, labor
force growth, and government spending growth—continue to be estimated precisely in the
sample of developed countries.
191 See generally David Reifschneider et al., Aggregate Disturbances, Monetary Policy, and the
Macroeconomy: The FRB/US Perspective, 85 FED. RESERVE BULL. 1 (1999); John B. Dis-
cretion Versus Policy Rules in Practice, 39 r,—.RNEGIi-ROCIIESTER CONF. SERIES ON PUB. POLY
195 (1993).
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Another source of evidence is simply asking economists what they
think. In a recent survey of 134 public finance and labor economists,
the estimated median effect of TRA 86 on the long-term size of the
economy was 1%. 152
 Note that TRA 86 did not reduce public saving,
so the growth effect was entirely due to changes in marginal tax rates
and the tax base. The median response also suggested that the 1993
tax increases had no effect on economic growth. The 1993 Act raised
tax rates on the highest income households, but also increased na-
tional saving.
A final approach considers simulations of the growth effects of
fundamental tax reform. The most complete model of tax reform
finds that a flat tax with transition relief would raise national income
by 0.5% after fifteen years. 153 Without transition relief, the flat tax
would impose a one-time wealth tax, and the economy would grow by
2.2% over fifteen years. This comparison suggests that the bulk of the
growth effects of consumption taxes are due to one-time wealth ef-
fects that might be imposed rather than the much-publicized changes
in economic incentives at the margin. 154 This has two implications for
interpreting the recent tax cuts. First, the effects of the much smaller
effective marginal tax rate reductions involved in the 2001 and 2003
Acts would be much less significant. Second, the dividend and capital
gains tax cuts in the 2003 Act subsidize old investment rather than
imposing a one-time tax on it. The subsidy to old investment will re-
duce any positive effects on growth.
V. SHORT-TERM STIMULUS
A particular goal of each of the 2001, 2002, and 2003 tax cuts was
to spur the economy in the short term. According to the National Bu-
reau of Economic Research Business Cycle Dating Committee, a re-
cession began in March 2001 and ended in November 2001. Figure 6
152 See generally Victor R. Fuchs et al., Economists' Views About Parameters, Values, and Poli-
cies: Survey Results in Labor and Public Economies, 36 J. EcoN. Lrr. 1387 (1998).
155 See generally Altig et al„ supra note 102.
151 See generally STAFF OF JOINT COMM, ON TAXATION, JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION
TAX MODELING PROJECT AND 1997 TAx SYMPOSIUM PAPERS (JCS-21-97) (Comm. Print
1997), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/s-21-97.pdf;  Altig at al„ supra note 102; Alan
J. Auerbach, Tax Reform, Capital Allocation, Efficiency, and Growth, in ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF
FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 29 (Henryi Aaron & William G. Gale eds., 1996); Kenneth L.
Judd, The Impact of Tax Reform in Modern Dynamic Economies, in TRANSITION COSTS OF FUN-
DAMENTAL TAX REFORM 5 {Kevin A. Hassett & R. Glenn Hubbard eds., 2001).
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shows, however, that economic activity remained sluggish for an ex-
tended period of time after the official end of the recession. Real
GDP growth remained weak until the latter part of 2003, and em-
ployment growth was even more sluggish, with non-farm employment
remaining below its November 2001 level well into 2004.
According to President Bush's chief economic adviser, N. Greg-
ory Mankiw, the economy has done better in the short term with the
recent tax cuts than it would have without: "'tiff we had left taxes ex-
actly as they were when the president took office, many, many more
people would be unemployed today. What I'm saying is sort of stan-
dard economy textbook economics." 155
Professor Mankiw's statement is narrowly and carefully framed,
but it does not address the real questions associated with the short-
term effects of the tax cuts, and it should not be interpreted as evi-
dence that the tax cuts represent an effective short-term stimulus for
at least two reasons. 15° First, the statement compares the tax cuts to
doing nothing, whereas other policy changes—including differently
structured tax cuts and spending programs—were and are relevant
options. Second, Professor Mankiw's statement focuses only on
whether any stimulus was provided. But in an economy with excess
capacity, such as the United States between 2001 and 2004, many
forms of fiscal loosening—whether a tax cut or spending increase—
can spur aggregate demand and therefore provide a short-terra boost
to the economy.
A key issue is whether the stimulus was provided in the most ef-
fective way. In particular, we focus on the "bang for the buck"—the
effective stimulus per dollar spent—and we examine the tax cuts
compared to other alternatives, not just compared to doing nothing.
We show that the passage of the tax cuts was well-timed to offset
economic downturns, but several elements of the structure of the tax
cuts were poorly designed to provide a short-term stimulus. For ex-
ample, the tax cuts were predominantly back-loaded and did not
channel funds toward groups with the highest marginal propensity to
consume additional resources. In addition, many of the provisions
were intended to stimulate saving, not consumption. As a result of
these design flaws—from the perspective of providing stimulus—the
tax cuts had at best a small positive "bang for the buck" relative to
I" Timothy Catts, White House Economists Laud Tax Guts as Source of Economic Recovery,
102 Tut Noyes 826 (2004) (quoting N. Gregory Mankiw),
156 See infra notes 158-160 and accompanying text.
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other options. The most comprehensive studies to date by academic
researchers imply that the tax cuts reduced GDP and employment in
2001, and had virtually no effect on these aggregates in 2002. An al-
ternative package, such as one containing significant state fiscal relief
and tax cuts targeted at low-income households, could have provided
more stimulus with lower short-term and long-term budgetary costs.
Before turning to these issues, we emphasize the important dis-
tinctions between the short-run stimulus effect of tax policies and the
long-term growth effects emphasized in the previous Part. 157
 In a slack
economy, tax policies can affect short-term GDP by changing aggre-
gate demand. In the long run, however, tax policies change the size of
the economy by altering aggregate supply—the level and allocation of
labor supply, saving, investment, and risk-taking. Thus, although both
patterns are commonly referred to as "economic growth," they are
conceptually distinct.
A. Estimates of the Short-Term Effects of Recent Tax Cuts
1. Overall Effects
A number of studies provide evidence on the effects of the tax
cuts on short-term economic activity. Christopher L. House and Mat-
thew D. Shapiro use a general equilibrium model to examine the ef-
fects of stylized tax cuts that are very similar in structure, timing, and
magnitude to the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts. 158 They find that the 2001
tax cut substantially reduced employment, output, and investment dur-
ing 2001 and had no effect during 2002. They are not alone in this
assessment. The Wall Street Journal, a strong supporter of the tax cuts.
asserts that "delayed tax cuts are likely to depress the economy." 159
Professors House and Shapiro estimate that in the first six months fol-
lowing the enactment of the policy, GDP falls below trend by 0.9%,
and employment falls by 0.1%. Investment falls sharply initially and
remains below trend for two and one-half years, with very big declines
(0,6% of trend) in the first quarter. Consumption rises and stays high.
In the second year (2002), GDP is just barely above trend by 0.02%.
This pattern and the general magnitude of the effects holds regardless
of whether the tax cuts are perceived as temporary or permanent. 16°
157 See supra notes 92-154 and accompanying text.
I" See generally HOUSE & SHAPIRO, supra note 108.
09
 Waco Call, WALL ST. J„ Aug. 13, 2002, at A20.
160 See generally House & SHAPIRO, supra note 108.
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The reasoning is straightforward. Phased-in, or deferred, tax cuts
on labor income currently give workers incentives to work less (be-
cause after-tax wages are low currently relative to future values), but to
consume more now (because of the income effect associated with fu-
ture tax cuts). Deferred tax cuts on capital income help spur invest-
ment now because the investment returns, which occur largely in the
future, will be taxed at lower rates. The 2001 tax cut. was a combina-
tion of deferred tax cuts on labor and capital income, but the overall
effects of the cut mirror those of labor income tax cuts because labor
income constitutes the large majority of overall income and because
tax rates were cut more on labor income than on capital income in
2001. Professors House and Shapiro have examined the bonus depre-
ciation provisions enacted in 2002. 161 They have shown that these poli-
cies raised output by about 0.1% in 2003 and 2004.
Professors House and Shapiro have also examined the effects of
the 2003 tax cut, which accelerated the implementation of the provi-
sions of the 2001 Act and reduced the taxation of dividends and capi-
tal gains. 162 Thus, the 2003 Act provides incentives to raise labor sup-
ply and production immediately. Overall, the results suggest that GDP
was lower in 2001 than it would have been without the tax cuts, was
about the same in 2002 as it would have been otherwise, and was
about 2.4% higher in 2004 than it would have been in the absence of
the tax cuts. 163 Such effects are significant, but need to be compared
to the costs: the tax cuts reduced revenue in 2004 alone by about $270
billion, or 2.4% of GDP.
The 8% annualized growth rate in the third quarter of 2003,
shown in Figure 1, led some adVocates to claim that the tax cuts had
proven to be an effective stimulus. Formal analysis, however, suggests
that tax cuts were only a very small part of the one-quarter spurt in
activity. An estimate based on Professors House and Shapiro, for ex-
ample, would find that the recent tax cuts raised GDP by just 0.6% in
the third quarter of 2003. 164 Economy.com attributed about 1.0 per-
centage point of the growth spurt to the tax cuts. 165 Many additional
161 See generally Christopher L. House & Matthew D. Shapiro, Temporary Investment Tax
Incentives: Theory with Evidence from Bonus Depreciation (Sept. 28, 2004), available at http://
www.econ.yale.edu/seminars/macro/mac04/house041026.pdf
 (paper presented at Yale
Dep't Econ., Macroeconomics Workshop, Oct. 26, 2004).
162 See generally HOUSE & SHAPIRO, supra note 108.
10
 See generally id.; House & Shapiro, supra note 161.
104 See generally HOUSE & SIIAPIRO, supra note 108; House & Shapiro. supra note 161.
166 Contributions to Real GDP Growth, EcoNosmcom (2003).
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factors contributed, including an expansive monetary policy, which
reduced short- and long-term interest rates to historic lows and
spurred huge amounts of mortgage refinancing. Other factors may
have contributed, too, such as a reduction in uncertainty following
the major military campaign in Iraq, the technology cycle, govern-
ment spending, and so on.
Other studies also yield results indicating small effects of the tax
cuts on the economy. Doctors Elmendorf and Reifschneider, using
the FRB-US model, conclude that an income tax cut of 1.0% of GDP
increases real GDP by between 0.5% and 1.0% after one year, depend-
ing on the responsiveness of financial markets and the share of
households that base their consumption on current income rather
than permanent income. 160
The CBO used two macroeconometric models to analyze the
short-term impact of the budget proposals included in the Bush ad-
ministration's Fiscal Year 2004 budget, which included the basic
framework of the 2003 tax cut. 167 It found that the effect on real GDP
in 2004 would be between 1.0% and 1.3%, about the same magnitude
as the increase in the budget deficit as a share of GDP under the Bush
administration's policies relative to the CBO baseline.
2. Effects on Consumption
Several studies have examined the effects of the 2001 and 2003
"rebates" on consumer spending. These studies generally suggest small
aggregate impacts on consumption.
a. The Marginal Propensity to Consume
Matthew D. Shapiro and Joel B. Slemrod report that 22% of
households receiving the 2001 rebate reported that they expected to
"mostly spend" it, as opposed to saving it or using it to pay down
debt. 168
 They report a plausible set of assumptions that implies that
the aggregate marginal propensity to consume out of the rebate was
166 See generally Elmendorf & Reifschneider, supra note 109.
167 See generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGETARY
PROPOSALS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004 (2003), available at latp://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/40xx/
doc4080/Report.pdf (last modified Mar. 28, 2003).
168
 Matthew D. Shapiro & Joel Slemrod, Consumer Response to Tax Rebates, 93 Am. ECON.
REV. 381, 381 (2001).
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about 35%. 169 They also claim, based on answers to follow-up ques-
tions and the wording of the original question, that the results are
best interpreted as describing what households intended to do with
the rebate during the first year after receipt. Finally, they show that
personal saving rates spiked in the months when the rebate was re-
ceived, and that the increase in personal saving can be accounted for
fully by the tax rebates.
David S. Johnson, Jonathan A. Parker, and Nicholas S. Souleles
find somewhat stronger effects on consumption.'" Using a special
module of the Consumer Expenditure Survey designed to elicit sur-
vey responses about how households used the rebate, and exploiting
the fact that the timing of the rebates was essentially random, the au-
thors find that households spent between 20% and 40% of the rebates
on non-durable goods during the three-month period in which the
rebates were received and spent perhaps another third of the rebate
in the second three-month period.
Two studies have also examined the effects of the changes in the
child credit and withholding allowances in 2003. Professors Shapiro
and Slemrod find that among those who qualified for the child credit
expansion, 26% said they would "mostly spend" the funds, 26% would
save the funds, and the remainder would pay down debt."' The
change in withholding rules generated even smaller propensities to
spend. Julia Coronado, Joseph Lupton, and Louise Sheiner estimate
the determinants of the usage of funds reported by households. 1"
They obtain an estimated aggregate marginal propensity to consume
of 24% for income due to the changes in the child credit and 16% for
income due to the changes in withholding.
b. Effect on Aggregate Consumption
The studies of the 2001 rebate suggest marginal propensities to
consume out of the rebate ranging from 35% over the first year to
two-thirds in the first six months. Because the rebates totaled $38 bil-
lion in 2001, or 0.38% of GDP, the effect on consumption would be
between $13 billion and $26 billion, or between 0.13% and 0.26% of
GDP in 2001. For the 2003 tax cut, both the size of the rebates and
159 See generally Matthew D. Shapiro & Joel Slemrod, Did the 2001 Tax Rebate Stimulate
Spending? Evidence from Taxpayer Sunnys, 17 TAX POL'Y & ECON. 83 (2003).
170
	 generallyJmorson ET AL., supra note 119.
171
 See generally Shapiro & Slemrod, supra note 169.
172 Sec generally Julia Coronado et al, Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys., Priming the
Pump? Household Spending Responses to the 2003 TaX Cuts (2004) (work in progress).
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the estimated marginal propensity to consume out of them appear to
be somewhat smaller. In short, the aggregate effects of the rebates on
consumption and GDP were quite small.
3. Effects on Investment
A number of studies examine the effects of the accelerated de-
predation provisions of the 2002 tax cut. The effect of the bonus de-
preciation provision is smaller when the inflation and nominal inter-
est rates are lower, because the difference between expensing and
depreciation is attenuated at low inflation. 175 Goldman Sachs suggests
that given the relatively low levels of nominal interest rates and infla-
tion, the value of the bonus depreciation provision is "relatively mod-
est." The Goldman Sachs calculations suggest that the bonus depre-
ciation provision reduces the after-tax cost of computer purchases, for
example, by only 2%. 174
 Darrel S. Cohen, Dorthe-Pernille Hansen,
and Kevin A. Hassett estimate that bonus depreciation reduced the
cost of capital on new equipment investment by between 1.2% and
4%, depending on the tax life of the asset and assumptions about
whether the provision would be made permanent." 5 Applying an in-
vestment elasticity of about 0.7 suggests that investment would rise by
between 0.8% and 2.8% 176
 Because equipment investment is less than
10% of GDP, investment would rise by roughly 0.1% to 0.3% of GDP.
Mihir A. Desai and Austan D. Goolsbee find that the bonus deprecia-
tion provisions may have raised investment by 2%. 177 As noted above,
Professors House and Shapiro find almost no impact of the bonus de-
preciation provisions on GDP. 170
The effect of the reduction in dividend and capital gains taxes in
2003 on investment depends on whether the old or new view holds, on
the identity of the marginal investor, and on other factors. Robert Car-
' 73 See generally Darrel S. Cohen et al., The Effects of Temporary Partial Expensing on In-
vestment Incentives in the United States, 55 NAT'L TAx J. 457 (2005).
174 Depreciation Bonus to Have Minor Impact on Investment, US ECON, DAILY FIN, MARKET
COMMENT (Goldman, Sachs & Co. Inv. Research, New York, N.Y.), Jan. 21, 2004.
175 See generally Cohen et al„ supra note 173.
1711
 See generally Jason G. Cummins et al., A Reconsideration of Investment Behavior Using Tax
Reforms as Natural Experiments, in 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. AC-111/11T 1 (William C.
Brainard & George L. Perry eds., 1994) (deriving the 0.7 value from empirical data), avail-
able at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20030213_rahass94b.pdf
 (date posted Jan. 1, 2000).
177 See generalt5,
 Mihir A. Desai & Aus tan D. Goolsbee, Investment, Capital Overhang and Fis-
cal Policy (Sept. 2004), available at http://www.brookings.edu/dybdocroot/es/conunentary/
journals/bpea_macro/forum/090704desai.pdf.
178 See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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roll, Kevin A. Hassett, and James B. Mackie III estimate that President
Bush's plan would reduce the economy-wide marginal effective tax
rate on capital to 17.3% from 19.1% under the old view and to 16.6%
from 17.4% under the new view. 179 Those estimates translate into re-
ductions in the user cost of capital of about 1%. (Doctors Carroll, Has-
sett, and Mackie provide a crosswalk from the effective tax rate to the
user cost of capital.) 180 In short, the likely investment responses from
the dividend and capital gains rate reductions and the bonus deprecia-
tion provisions should be expected to be small.
C. Bang for the Buck
William Gale, Peter Orszag, and Gene Sperling discuss the con-
cept of the "bang for the buck," the ratio of the stimulative effect of a
tax cut. (or spending program) divided by the revenue loss (or budget
costs). 181
1. Tax Structure
A recovery package with a significant "bang for the buck" needs
to be both well-timed and well-structured. The recent tax cuts were
well-timed, but poorly structured for short-term stimulus. It should
not be surprising that the tax cuts were poorly structured to provide
stimulus. The 2001 Act was designed in 1999 in a booming economy
in which recession was not a central concern. Rather, the motivating
issues were how to offset. a political attack from Steve Forbes and how
to fashion a long-term tax cut. The original legislation proposed by
President Bush after he was inaugurated contained no tax cuts until
2002. The 2001 "rebates" were added by the Congress.
Historically, discretionary tax policy has had a weak record in
stimulating short-term economic activity in a timely and effective
179 See generally Robert Carroll et al., The Effect of Dividend Tax Relief on Investment Incen-
tives, 56 NAT'L Tax J. 629 (2003).
Igo See generally id.
181 See generally William Gale et al., Tax Stimulus Options in the Aftermath of the Terrorist At-
tack, 93 Tax NoTEs 255 (2001), available at http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/views/
articles/gale/20011008.pdf. The importance of focusing on the "bang for the buck" was
highlighted in October 2001 in an unusual bipartisan statement from the Republican and
Democratic leaders of the budget committees in the House of Representatives and the
Senate supporting a stimulus package and putting forward several key principles, includ-
ing that the measures should "achieve the greatest possible stimulus effect per dollar
spent." See SENATE BUDGET COMM. & HOUSE BUDGET COMM., 197TH CONC.., REVISED
BUDGETARY OUTLOOK AND PRINCIPLES FOR ECONOMIC STIMULUS 5 (2001), available at
http://budget.senate.gov/democratic/press/2001/rev_bdgtou dook100401.pdf.
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manner. 182
 Timing, in particular, has been a major problem in the
past. It was not uncommon for the economy to have already entered a
recovery stage by the time Congress enacted countercyclical legisla-
tion. In sharp contrast, the recent tax cuts have been extremely well-
timed to address the economic slowdown. The 2001 tax cut was en-
acted while the economy was in recession. The 2002 and 2003 tax cuts
were enacted while economic activity remained sluggish.
Despite the fortuitous timing, however, the tax cuts were designed
poorly for stimulus purposes. First, the 2001 tax cut was heavily back-
loaded, with phased-in reductions in marginal tax rates. Such back-
loading reduces the ability of the tax cut to stimulate the economy for
several reasons. The projected out-year costs raise long-term interest
rates immediately, which dampens demand for durable goods and in-
vestrnents. 183
 The phase-in of lower tax rates can reduce labor supplyi"
and may delay the potential increase in spending. 185
Second, the tax cuts were regressive; in particular, they provided
larger percentage increases in after-tax income for higher-income
households than for lower-income households. Although the evidence
is not determinative, it appears that low-income households have
higher marginal and average propensities to spend out of current in-
come than higher-income households.' Evidence from the 2001 tax
151 See generally LAWRENCE B. LINDSEY, THE GROWTH EXPERIMENT; How TILE NEW TAX
POLICY IS TRANSFORMING THE U.S. ECONOMY (1990); Franco Iviodigiliani & Charles Stein-
del, Is a Tax Rebate an Effective Tool for Stabilization Policy?, in 1977 BROOKINGS PAI'ERS ON
ECON. ACTIVITY 175 (Arthur M. Okun & George L. Perry eds., 1977); John B Taylor, Reas-
sessing rDiscretionary Fiscal Policy, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Summer 2000, at 21.
'as See generally Elmendorf & Reifschneider, supra note 109; William G. Gale & Peter R.
Orszatc, The Economic Effects of Sustained Budget Deficits, 56 NAT'L TAX J. 463 (2003).
184 See generally HOUSE & SHAPIRO, supra note 108.
"5 See generally NICHOLAS S. SOULELES, CONSUMER SENTIMENT: ITS RATIONALITY AND
USEFULNESS IN FORECASTING EXPENDITURE—EVIDENCE FROM THE MICHIGAN MICRO DATA
(Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8410, 2001) (revised version published
as Nicholas S. Souleles, Expectations, Heterogeneous Forecast Errors, and Consumption: Micro
Evidence from the Michigan Consumer Sentiment Surveys, 36 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 39
(2004), available at hup://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/-souleles/research/papers/Conf
JMCB55,pdf); Nicholas S. Souleles, The Response of Household Consumption to Income Tax
Refunds, 89 MN. ECON. REV. 947 (1999) [hereinafter Souleles, Income Tax Refunds]; Jona-
than Parker, The Consumption Function Re-Estimated (Aug. 1999) (unpublished manu-
script), http://www.princeton.edu/-jparker/research/cfunc1199.pdf.
' 88See generally KAREN E. DYNAN ET AL., Do THE RICH SAVE MORE? (Fed. Reserve Bd., Fin.
& Econ. Discussion Series No. 2000-52, 2000), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
pubs/feds/2000/200052/200052pap.pdf; JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 119; Parker, supra note
185. The CBO notes that "[a]s a general proposition, higher-income households save more
of their income than do lower-income households. Although occasionally some data emerge
to indicate otherwise, a large accumulation of evidence continues to show that as a house-
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cuts bears out this tendency. David S. Johnson, Jonathan A. Parker, and
Nicholas S. Souleles show that the marginal propensity to consume the
2001 rebate was 0.75 for households in their low-income category, sub-
stantially higher than their overall average of 0.20 to 0.40. 187
Third, many of the provisions from the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts—
including estate tax repeal, and increases in tax-free savings allow-
ances—ostensibly were designed to raise saving, regardless of their
actual effect. Raising saving is precisely the opposite of what is re-
quired to provide short-term demand stimulus.
Fourth, even those provisions that ostensibly were designed to
raise consumption, such as reductions in dividend taxes, were
inefficient ways of doing so. 1 a8 One claim was that dividend tax cuts
would boost the stock market, raising wealth and therefore raising
consumption. This effect is likely to be small relative to other options.
Under simplifying assumptions, a reduction in the present value of
dividend taxes by one dollar should raise the stock market by one dol-
lar and raise current consumption spending by just three to five cents.
Fifth, generally temporary investment incentives should encour-
age more demand in the near term than permanent incentives (be-
cause a temporary incentive has a more substantial effect on the after-
tax cost of investment today relative to the future). The bonus depre-
ciation provisions were explicitly temporary at least partially for this
reason. Even with this provision, however, policymakers may have un-
dercut the stimulus effect. First, contrary to theory and evidence, the
Bush administration's economists argued that making the tax cuts
hold's income rises, the proportion of that income that is consumed falls." CONG. BUDGET
OFFICE, ECONOMIC S'FIMULUS: EVALUATING PROPOSED CHANGES IN TAX POLICY 7 (2002),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/32xx/doc3251/FiscalStimulus.pdf  (last modified
Jan. 4. 2002).
187 See generallyJOIINSON ET AL., supra note 119. Matthew D. Shapiro and Joel B. Slem-
rod report that there is no difference by income group in households answers to questions
about whether they "mostly spent" the data. But as they note, the relation between respon-
dent's answers to the question and their actual Marginal Propensity to Consume ("MPC")
is more subtle. Thus, their findings do not necessarily imply that the MPC is the same
across income groups. See generally Shapiro & Slemrod, supra note 169. In addition, none of
the consumption studies mentioned above take into account the fact that high-income
households received a larger permanent (or decade-long) tax cut than did low-income
households in 2001 and 2003. To the extent that households adjust their consumption
based on expected future income, those adjustments imply that the studies could be over-
estimating the MPC among high-income households and therefore underestimating the
extent to which the MPC for low-income households exceeds the MPC for high-income
households.
188 See generally Burman et al., supra note 90; Gravelle, supra note 137.
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permanent would provide a bigger stimulus. 189 Second, although the
2002 tax cut set the first-year write-off at 30% of investment value for
investments made before September 11, 2004, in 2003 Congress and
the Bush administration extended the expiration date to the end of
2004 and expanded the write-off to 50%. These legislative actions and
encouragement by senior Bush administration officials may have given
businesses the indication that policymakers were willing to consider
extending this provision or making it permanent. Indeed, a survey by
the National Association of Business Economists, released on January
20, 2004, found that 62% of respondents expected the provisions to be
extended. 19° (Interestingly, an even larger share, 73%, reported that
bonus depreciation had no effect on their firm's investment.) 191
lag On the October 7, 2001, edition of This Week, George Stephanopoulos asked then
CEA Chairman Glenn Hubbard whether temporary investment incentives would have a
larger "bang for the buck" than permanent incentives. Glenn Hubbard claimed that was
not the case:
STEPHANOPOULOS: And [the President] says the answer is tax cuts, but the
bipartisan leadership of the House and Senate Budget Committee says that any
tax cuts have to be temporary. The president's business tax cuts are permanent.
Mr. HUBBARD: Well, I wouldn't put it quite that way. I think what the leader-
ship is saying is that we want a tax package that doesn't have very long-term
adverse consequences for the budget. That could include some things that
look like permanent changes. For example, accelerating the rate cuts is just
simply moving forward something that was to have happened anyway. The
expensing plan the president mentioned with also a very small out year cost.
STEPHANOPOULOS: Well, but—but once you get more bang for the buck on
that business expensing, if the businesses know they have one shot at it, they
have to do it now.
Mr. HUBBARD: Wrong. The one thing we know in economics about very tem-
porary investment incentives is that in Washington, we have very poor ability to
fine tune and micromanage the economy. A permanent investment incentive
would be the best way to go or at least one that's of several year's duration.
This Week (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 7, 2001).
' 9° Employment Finally Improves as the Economy Roars Ahead: NABE Panel, ART AND Aim
(Rhodes Econometrics, Inc., Lake Oswego, Or.), Jan. 19, 2004 (presenting information
from the National Association for Business Economics, Washington, D.C.).
III Id. Another issue in designing a stimulus package is whether temporary income tax
cuts or one-time rebates focused on low-income households may have a higher "bang for
the buck" than permanent tax cuts aimed at higher income households. Both theory and
evidence suggest that the propensity to spend out of permanent tax cuts is higher than for
temporary tax cuts. See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, A THEORY OF "ME CONSUMPTION
FUNCTION (1957); SOULELES, supra note 185. Nevertheless, temporary tax cuts focused on
liquidity-constrained households might nonetheless have a higher 'bang for the buck" than
permanent tax cuts aimed at high-income (non-constrained) households. First, the evi-
dence suggests some positive responses to temporary tax cuts and further suggests that
households do not respond to scheduled tax changes until they take effect. See generally
Alan S. Blinder, The Time Series Consumption Function Revisited, in 1985 BROOKINGS PAPERS
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2. Estimates
Given the concerns listed above, it is perhaps not surprising that
estimates of the "bang for the buck" of the enacted tax cuts are rela-
tively low, and estimates for other policies are significantly higher. 192
For example, as noted above, evidence indicates that the tax cuts
raised GDP by 0.6% in 2004. 193 Yet the tax cuts in 2004 alone reduced
revenues by $286 billion, or about 2.5% of GDP. Using these esti-
mates, the "bang for the buck" is extremely low, just 0.24 (0.6/2.5).
A number of studies and statements bear out the conclusion that
a tax cut or spending increase that was more progressive and more
focused on consumption rather than saving would have provided a
much larger "bang for the buck" than the tax cuts did.
First, data in Economy.com imply a "bang for the buck" of about
0.70 for the President Bush's tax proposals in 2003. 194 But the programs
with the largest "bang for the buck" are those that target low- and mod-
erate-income households, including the child tax credit rebate (1.04)
and the acceleration of the 10% bracket (1.34). In contrast, the divi-
dend tax cut scored remarkably poorly in this regard, with a "bang for
the buck" less than 0.10. 195 Likewise, several policies emphasized by
ON ECON. AcTivrne 465 (William C. Brainard & George L. Perry eds., 1985); Arthur M.
Okun, The Mirage of Steady Inflation, in 1971 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 485
(Arthur M. Okun & George L. Perry eds.,.1971); Jonathan Parker, The Reaction of Household
Consumption to Predictable Changes in Social Security Taxes, 89 Am. EcoN. REV. 959 (1999);
James M. Poterba, Are Consumers Forward : Looking? Evidence from Fiscal Experiments, 78 AM.
ECON. REV. 413 (1988) (showing positive responses to temporary tax cuts); Nicholas S.
Souleles, Consumer Response to the Reagan Tax Cuts, 851 PUB. ECON. 99 (2002); Souleles,
Income Tax Refunds, supra note 185. In particular, evidence suggests that a significant por-
tion of the population bases consumption decisions on current income rather than per-
manent income, perhaps because they are liquidity constrained. See generally John Camp-
bell & N. Gregory Mankiw, Permanent Income, Current Income, and Current Consumption, 81
Bus. & EcoN. STAT. 265 (1990). For such households, the propensity to spend out of tem-
porary tax breaks may be roughly the same as the propensity to spend out of permanent
tax breaks. Indeed, David S. Johnson, Jonathan A. Parker, and Nicholas S. Souleles found
that low-income households consumed most of the rebates they received from the 2001 tax
legislation. See generallyjoimsoN ET AL., supra note 119. But see generally Shapiro Sc Slemrod,
supra note 169 (finding no such income-related responses). Second, permanent tax cuts
impose substantially larger fiscal costs than temporary tax cuts. Thus, the "bang for the
buck" may be lower for permanent tax cuts than for temporary cuts even if the marginal
propensity to consume is higher.
192 See supra notes 182-191 and accompanying text
193 See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
194
 The Economic Impact of the Bush and Congressional Democratic Economic Stimulus Plans,
EcoNorent.com (Feb. 2003); Regional Financial Review, EcoNomv.com
 (May 2003).
193
 This is consistent with a statement signed by ten winners of the Nobel Prize in Eco-
nomics, which noted that "IR] he permanent dividend tax cut, in particular, is not credible
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others receive high scores. Extension of federal unemployment insur-
ance benefits had the single highest bang-for-the-buck ratio, 1.74. Aid
to state governments also would prove to be a very helpful stimulus,
with a ratio of 1.24. Economy.com  offers an alternative set of proposals
that would emphasize increasing aggregate demand among low- and
moderate-income households and estimates a "bang for the buck" of
several times that of President Bush's tax proposals.' 96
The CBO reports similar rankings of President Bush's policies
and other policies.'97 The CBO concludes that "bang [s] for the buck"
are "small" for accelerating the EGTRRA tax-rate cuts, which JGTRRA
did, and for cutting taxes on capital gains, and they are "medium" for
temporary investment incentives. 198
 The largest ratios were found for
tax cuts aimed at low- and moderate-income households.
All of these items imply that the tax cuts were poorly designed to
stimulate the economy, and that better options could have provided a
bigger short-term boost with a smaller long-term cost.
VI. TAX REFORM
In think tank circles and academic conferences, former top Bush
administration officials and other tax-cut supporters sometimes de-
fend the tax cuts as a piecemeal approach to fundamental tax reform
and a way to move the nation toward a consumption tax. These de-
fenses are clever, because reform seems a nobler goal than merely
slashing taxes. Consistent with fundamental reform, the recent tax
cuts and Bush administration proposals have reduced marginal tax
rates on capital income and flattened the rate structure. But the simi-
larities end there.
First, a well-designed consumption tax can modestly raise national
saving and economic growth. To obtain this result, though, the con-
sumption needs to (1) be revenue-neutral, (2) broaden the base, (3)
tax existing capital—that is, not provide transition relief, and (4) treat
interest income and expense in a consistent manner. But the recent
tax cuts (1) lose substantial amounts of revenue, (2) do not broaden
the base, (3) reduce taxes on existing capital, and (4) increase the dif-
ference in the tax treatment of interest income and expense.
as a short-term stimulus." ECONOMISTS' STATEMENT OPPOSING THE Bust! TAX CUT'S (Feb.
10, 2003), available at hup://www.epinet.org/stmt/2003/statement_signecl.pdf.
196
 See generally Zandi, supra note 110.
197 See generally CoNo. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 186.
I" Id. at 27 tb1.1.
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Second, some tax-cut supporters downplay such concerns, argu-
ing that the criticisms represent the perfect as being the enemy of the
good. But the underlying point is that the system that emerges from
President Bush's tax cuts has many of the worst features of both the
previously existing tax system and a fundamentally reformed system.
The tax cuts will generate none of the potential growth effects of fun-
damental reform, and in fact will reduce long-term economic growth.
There will be no efficiency gains from broadening the base, because
no base broadening has occurred. There will be efficiency losses from
increasing taxpayers' ability to shelter income, due to the enlarged
difference between the taxation of capital income and capital ex-
pense. One feature that the current tax system now shares with fun-
damental reform, compared to the tax system before 2001, is in-
creased regressivity.
Third, recent tax cuts and current proposals do not move the
system toward a well-designed consumption tax or a well-designed
wage tax. Instead, tax policy and proposals in the Bush administration
move the tax system toward a wage tax that is imposed only on low-
and middle-income households, because upper-income households
would be able to take disproportionate advantage of the fact that capi-
tal income would be increasingly exempt from taxation, but interest
payments would still be tax-deductible. And by cutting revenue and
rates without implementing any of the necessarily painful steps that
real reform would necessarily entail, the tax cuts probably have dimin-
ished the political possibilities of enacting a well-designed tax reform.
The bottom line is that the recent tax cuts, and the proposed ad-
ditional policies, would reduce national saving, reward owners of ex-
isting capital, and create new shelters by substantially reducing the
taxation of capital income while retaining deductions for borrowing
costs. These features are not consistent with any sensible tax system—
whether based on income, consumption, or wages. Moreover, the
changes will prove regressive and will make the changes associated
with serious tax reform more difficult to establish in the future. This
hardly amounts to an agenda for fundamental tax reform.
A. Fundamental Tax Reform
The U.S. "income" tax features graduated tax rates and a tax base
that is a complex hybrid between consumption and income, with
some features that are inconsistent with income or consumption taxa-
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tion. 199
 Proposals for so-called fundamental tax reform—such as the
flat tax or a national retail sales tax—aim to replace the current in-
come tax, and sometimes other taxes as well, with a broad-based, flat-
rate tax on consumption.m
1. Consumption Taxes
The theoretical case for a consumption tax is easy to understand:
the goal is to raise national saving. Higher national saving would boost
long-term economic growth and living standards, because it. would
provide more machines, computers, and other productivity-increasing
equipment over time. Workers would enjoy higher earnings because,
with the extra equipment, they would be able to produce more per
hour.
All studies find that shifting to a well-designed consumption tax
would generate at least modest increases in national saving and eco-
nomic growth, 201
 To be "well-designed"—that is, to generate an in-
crease in national saving—a consumption tax needs to contain at least
the following four features: (1) it should raise (at least) the same
amount of revenue as the taxes it replaces, (2) it should broaden the
tax base, (3) it should not provide transition relief to existing capital,
and (4) it should treat capital income and expense consistently. Al-
though the literature is unanimous in showing that a well-designed
consumption tax raises national saving and long-term economic
growth, the four features above are essential to obtaining that result.
It is by no means clear that a consumption tax change that omits
these features has positive economic effects.
It is clear why each of these design features matters. First, a con-
sumption tax that raises the same amount of revenue as the taxes it
replaces does not increase the federal deficit and thus does not re-
duce federal saving. 202
 This makes it easier to raise national saving, the
19° See generally COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, supra note 93.
000 See generally ROBERT HALL & ALVIN RABUSIIKA, THE FLAT TAX (1995) (proposing a
flat tax).
201 See generally, e.g., Joiri. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 154; ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF
FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM, supra note 154; Altig et al., supra note 102; Judd, supra note 154.
2°2
 To be clear, to obtain this result, the tax has to be budget neutral as well as revenue
neutral. That is, the tax has to raise sufficient revenue to maintain the existing level of
government programs. See generally William G. Gale, The Required Tax Rate in a National
Retail Sales Tax, 52 NAT'L TAX J. 443 (1999) (discussing further budget neutrality in the
context of a national retail sales tax).
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sum of private and public saving. The more public saving falls, the
greater the increase in private saving needed to raise national saving.
Second, a broader tax base allows for lower tax rates, holding
revenue constant. Even though consumption is smaller than income,
a consumption tax could in principle have a broader base than the
current Income" tax if the former taxes major consumption items
like housing and health care that are subsidized in the current system.
But that cannot happen if a move to a consumption tax is achieved
simply by eliminating the taxation of saving.
Third, a well-designed consumption tax reduces the taxation on
new saving but not on the return to, or principal on, existing capital.
In fact, it imposes an extra tax on existing capital. To see why, think of
someone with $100 in the bank at the time a consumption tax is
adopted. Under an income tax, the owner of the bank account could
withdraw the money and spend it without being taxed. Under a con-
sumption tax, though, the $100 would be taxed when it is withdrawn
and spent. Because the $100 bank account does not buy as much, af-
ter tax, its value is reduced under a consumption tax. 203
As a result, the shift to a well-designed consumption tax would
actually reduce the value of existing assets to their owners. A key find-
ing in academic analysis is that almost all of the economic benefit
from moving to a consurnotion tax derives from this one-time tax it
places on existing assets."' In contrast, consumption taxes that pro-
vide transition relief to existing capital—even if they are well designed
in the other ways described above—generate little or no positive ef-
fect on long-term growth." 5
Fourth, a well-designed consumption tax would eliminate the abil-
ity of taxpayers to deduct interest costs if they are not required to pay
"3 If the pre-tax price level falls after transition to a consumption tax, the issue is
somewhat more complex, but the basic result holds. See generally David F. Bradford, Con-
sumption Taxes: Some Fundamental Thins Won Issues, in FRONTIERS or TAX REFORM 123 (Mi-
chael 1. Boskin ed., 1996).
2°4 For example, a standard flat tax with a personal exemption of $9500 would raise
the size of the economy by 2.2% after fourteen years if assets held at the time of transition
were subject to the tax, as they would be under a consumption tax. But if at least partial
transition relief were granted for assets held at the time of transition (by continuing to
allow depreciation allowances on such assets), the economy would only be 0.5% larger
after fourteen years. See generally Altig et al., supra note 102; Auerbach, supra note 154; Eric
M. Engen & William G. Gale, The Effects of Fundamental Tax Reform on Saving, in ECONOMIC
EFFECTS OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM, supra note 154, at 83.
"5
 See supra notes 201-204 and accompanying text.
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tax on interest or other capital income. 206
 Without such a restriction,
large tax sheltering opportunities could be created. Imagine, for ex-
ample, someone who borrows $100 and deposits the money in a tax-
free savings account. If the individual borrows the money in a tax-
deductible form (for example, through a home equity loan), the net
effect is to create a tax shelter. The investment returns on the account
would be free from taxation, so no tax would be owed on the income,
but the individual would still enjoy a deduction for the borrowing costs.
The principal downside to even a well-designed flat-rate con-
sumption tax is that it is likely to be regressive relative to the current
system. Moving from a pure income tax base to a pure consumption
tax base, holding the rate structure constant, is regressive because
lower-income families tend to consume a larger share of their income
than higher-income families. Moving from a graduated rate structure
to flat rates, holding the tax base constant, is also regressive, because
it reduces the taxation of more affluent families relative to the less
affluent. As a result, the combined shift in base and rates involved in
moving from a progressive income tax to a flat-rate consumption tax
is regressive. 207
2. Wage Taxes
The fundamental difference between wage and consumption
taxes involves the treatment of people who own assets at the time the
new tax system is enacted. Intuitively, this result sterns from the fact
that, under some simplifying assumptions, future consumption can be
financed from either existing assets or future wages. Both items are
taxed under a consumption tax. But if existing assets are exempted,
the result is a tax on wages.
Thus, a consumption tax imposes a tax on assets held at the time
of the transition; future consumption that is financed out of existing
assets is fully taxable. As a result, a consumption tax actually reduces
206
 More generally, it would treat capital income and capital expenses consistently. If
interest income were taxed, interest expenses should be fully deductible.
207
 As a theoretical matter, the claim that moving from an income to a consumption
base is regressive is not as simple to maintain if base broadening occurs at the same time,
but studies confirm that a shift to a flat-rate consumption tax would be regressive compared
to the current system. See generally Daniel R. Feenberg et al., Distributional Effects of Adopting a
National Retail Sales Tax, 1] TAX POL'Y & ECON. 49 (1997); William G. Gale et al., Distribu-
tional Effects of Fundamental Tax Reform, in ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX RE-
FORM, supra note 154, at 281; William M, Gentry & R. Glenn Hubbard, Distributional Implica-
flans of Introducing a Broad-Based Consumption Tax, 1 1 TAX POL'Y & ECON. I (1997).
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the value of existing assets to their owners, as discussed above. 208 In
contrast, a wage tax does not impose any tax on existing capital. In
short, the key difference between the two systems is whether "transi-
tion relief' is provided.
As noted above, the absence of transition relief is what generates
most of the economic growth effects of consumption taxes. 209 Accord-
ingly, a wage tax has a smaller effect on economic growth than does a
consumption tax. Moreover, it requires higher marginal tax rates, be-
cause wages are substantially smaller than consumption. Finally, a wage
tax is significantly more regressive than a consumption tax, because
ownership of assets is highly skewed toward high-income households.
B. Comparing Fundamental Reform and Recent Tax Cuts
This Section describes how the recent tax cuts differ in rules and
effects from well-designed consumption taxes and concludes that the
recent tax cuts move the system' in the direction of what would effec-
tively be a wage tax imposed only on low- and moderate-income
households.
1. Features of Recent and Proposed Tax Changes
The recent tax cuts share several features with fundamental re-
form plans. They reduce the top marginal individual income tax
rates, reduce tax rates of capital income (dividends and capital gains)
even further, and eliminate the estate tax. The bonus depreciation
rules move toward a system in which investments are expensed in the
first year, albeit on a temporary basis.
Recent regulatory changes also push in the same direction. For
example, in January 2002, the Internal Revenue Service (the "IRS")
published a notice of proposed rulemaking to clarify its interpretation
of the 1992 Supreme Court decision in INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner.210 In INDOPCO, the Court ruled that expenses incurred by
firms preparing for a friendly takeover had to be capitalized rather
than expensed. The IRS rules put forward categories of safe harbors
under which intangible assets could be expensed rather than capital-
ized. Many practitioners are concerned that under the IRS rules,
208 See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
200 See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
210 Sec generally 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
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firms are given too much leeway to expense investments rather than
to depreciate them over time. 2 "
Moreover, proposals for greatly expanded tax-free saving ac-
counts would push even further toward elimination of tax on capital
income. The Bush administration has proposed two new types of indi-
vidual accounts—called Lifetime Saving Accounts ("LSA") and Re-
tirement Saving Accounts ("RSA"). LSAs would allow annual contri-
butions of $5000 per person per year. Although contributions would
not be deductible, account earnings and withdrawals would be tax-
free. Individuals could make contributions to their own accounts or to
anyone else's account with no income, age, or other restrictions.
Withdrawals could be made at any time for any purpose. RSAs are ba-
sically Roth IRAs, but with no income limit for contributions. They
would have similar features to LSAs, except that contributions could
not exceed earnings and withdrawals made before age fifty-eight (or
the death and disability of the owner) would be subject to a small
penalty. Over time, these proposals would allow an increasing share of
the returns to wealth to be sheltered from taxation. 212
2. Do the Recent Tax Cuts Look Like Fundamental Reform?
As noted above. well-designed consumption taxes should have at
least four features.2 " They should be revenue-neutral. They should
broaden the base. They should not subsidize old capital. They should
eliminate disparities between the treatment of capital income and
capital expense. The recent tax cuts fail all four of these tests.
First, the tax cuts are clearly not revenue-neutral. Over the 2001
through 2014 period, the enacted tax cuts, plus the costs of making
the 2001 and 2003 cuts permanent, would represent a revenue de-
cline of $3.3 trillion, and an increase in the budget deficit of $4.5 tril-
lion.214
 The revenue cost of the Bush administration's tax cuts should
provide a telling warning that they do not even move in the right di-
rection relative to the underlying goal of a well-designed consumption
tax. The key objective of such a tax is to raise national saving. It is
completely implausible, however, that any increase in private saving in
response to the tax breaks would offset their revenue loss. The Bush
211 See generally, e.g., JAcR H. TAYLOR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONG., TAX
DEDUCTIBILITY OF BUSINESS EXPENSES (2002).
212 See generally Burman et al., supra note 133.
213 See supra notes 201-206 and accompanying text.
2" See generally William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, Bush Administration Tax Policy: Reve-
nue and Budget Effects, 105 Tax NOTES 105 (2004).
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administration's deficit-financed tax cuts thus reduce national saving
and economic growth rather than increase it—exactly the opposite of
the fundamental goal of a consumption tax. Rather than potentially
trading off some increase in growth against more inequality in after-
tax income, as under academic Versions of a consumption tax, the tax
cuts give us both lower growth and more inequality.
Second, although a well-designed consumption tax would broaden
the base, the Bush administration's proposals contain no significant
movement in that direction. Third, the recent tax cuts subsidize old
capital, exactly the opposite of what a consumption tax would do. The
2001 and 2003 cuts not only do not impose a new tax on existing capi-
tal, but reduce taxes on such capital. The reductions in capital gains
and dividends taxes, for example, provide large benefits to owners of
existing stocks and hence are not well targeted toward exempting just
new saving. In effect, from the standpoint of economic growth, a major
attraction of a consumption tax is the ability to place an additional tax
on existing assets at the time of the transition. Yet the 2001 and 2003
cuts do exactly the opposite, reducing such taxes, and hence omitting
much of the potential economic gains from a consumption tax.
Fourth, a key difference in rules between the recent tax cuts and
fundamental reform involves the tax treatment of interest payments.
A well-designed income tax would tax interest income and allow de-
ductions for interest payments. A well-designed consumption tax
could treat interest the same way, or it could allow for nontaxation of
interest income coupled with nondeductibility of interest payments. The key
point is that any well-designed tax system would treat capital income
and capital expenses in a consistent manner. Yet although it is em-
bracing proposals that reduce or eliminate the tax on interest and
other capital income, the Bush ,administration has neither endorsed
nor proposed any such restrictions on deductions for interest pay-
ments. As a result, the recent tax cuts increase the disparity in the
treatment of capital income and expense. Proposals for RSAs and
LSAs would move the system substantially farther in that direction. As
explained above, without such restrictions, cuts in the taxation of
capital income expand the opportunities for tax sheltering, as long as
interest payments are deductible. 215 Roger Gordon, Laura K.alam-
bokidis, Jeffrey Rohaly, and Joel Slemrocl argue that if "the ultimate
destination of this [the Bush administration's] set of tax reforms is a
215 See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
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consumption tax base, then the most glaring omission from the dis-
cussion to date concerns interest deductibility." 216
3. A Wage Tax on Low- and Moderate-Income Households?
Households can always borrow and invest the funds. In a well-
designed tax system, this set of transactions would generate no net
gain, and of course it never generates net investment. Under the re-
forms advocated by the Bush administration, this set of transactions
would generate no taxable capital income (if the funds were invested,
say, in RSAs and LSAs), but it would generate deductions for interest
payments that could be used to reduce taxes on wage income. Be-
cause it seems likely that high-income households are either more
financially sophisticated or can better afford financial advice, it also
seems likely that the proposals advocated by the Bush administration
would lead not just toward a wage tax, but toward a wage tax that was
only paid by low- and moderate-income households. These changes
would imply that capital is subsidized and labor income bears both
the full weight of supporting government services and of paying for
the subsidies to capital income. This would be both extremely regres-
sive and detrimental to economic growth.
C. Five Easy Pieces
Policymakers generally have been reluctant to embrace the no-
tion of replacing the current system with a broad-based, flat-rate con-
sumption tax. Some advocates of moving to a consumption tax believe
that this is just a political economy problem. They have therefore
shifted to trying to achieve fundamental tax reform in several steps,
rather than in one fell swoop, and they defend the President Bush's
tax cuts as effecting such a piece-meal move toward a consumption
tax. The strategy is embodied in the "five easy pieces" delineated by
Ernest Christian, a former tax official in the Reagan administration. 217
According to one formulation of these five easy pieces, they include
the following:
• Reduced marginal income-tax rates, especially at the top;
2I6 See generally ROGER GORDON ET AL., TOWARD A CONSUMPTION TAX AND BEYOND
(Office of Tax Policy Research, Working Paper No. 20045, 2004), available at http://www.
bus.umich.edu/otpr/WP20045.pdf.
217 Sec Ernest S. Christian & Gary A. Robbins, Stealth Approach to Tax Reform, WASH.
TIMES, Nov. 1, 2002, at A21.
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• Increased contribution limits for tax-preferred savings accounts;
• Expensing (immediate write-offs) of business investment, rather
than depreciation over time;
• Repeal of the estate tax; and
• Reduction in dividends and capital gains taxes.
These "five easy pieces" are reflected, presumably not by coincidence,
in the Bush administration's recent tax cuts. The 2001 Act reduced
marginal tax rates and eventually repealed the estate tax. It also ex-
panded contribution limits to IRAs and 401 (k)s. The 2002 and 2003
Acts included "bonus depreciation" provisions for expensing business
investment, albeit only for part of capital outlays. The 2003 Act re-
duced capital gains and dividends taxes. The Bush administration has
also promoted vastly expanded tax-free savings accounts.
The claim, according to Ernest Christian and others, is that this
package of steps would move the nation very close to a consumption
tax with a flat rate of taxation. At first, this claim seems plausible. The
expansion in tax-free savings accounts, reduction in dividends and capi-
tal gains taxes, and repeal of the estate tax, for example, would reduce
or eliminate any tax on saving, as also would occur under a consump-
tion tax. Indeed, Bruce Bartlett, a leading conservative commentator,
noted the following in early 2003:
[Me can now see that Bush has had a strategy all along that
conforms exactly to the five easy pieces....
By Bush's second term, it is possible that we will have
made enough incremental progress toward a flat rate con-
sumption tax that we may finally see fundamental tax reform
fully enacted into law. 218
First impressions, however, can be quite misleading. The five easy
pieces fail all four tests of a well-designed consumption tax noted
above. 219 They are not revenue-neutral; instead, they reduce revenues
substantially. There is no base-broadening. They do not impose any
new burden on the owners of existing assets, as would occur under a
consumption tax; indeed, they subsidize the return to old capital. And
they increase the disparity between the tax treatment of interest in-
219 Bruce Bartlett, Rash's High Five, NAT'L. REV. ONLINE (Feb. 10, 2003), at http://www.
nationalreview.com/nrof
 bartlett/bardett021003.asp.
219 See supra notes 201-206 and accompanying text.
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come and interest deductions. The bottom line is that the five easy
pieces are really just five large, regressive tax cuts.
D. Prospects for Fundamental Reform
From a political economy perspective, tax reform always com-
bines gain and pain. The 2001 and 2003 tax cuts do the easy part of
tax reform, but they ignore the difficult part, and in so doing, will
make reform harder, not easier, to achieve.
For example, a well-enshrined principle of tax reform is to
broaden the base and lower the rates. Broadening the base involves
painful adjustments, because it removes a variety of subsidies or spe-
cial exemptions. Normally, such adjustments are made possible politi-
cally by a reduction in tax rates. But the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts re-
duced regular income tax rates without any effort to broaden the
base. Thus, a chance at reform was squandered, and the ability to use
those rate reductions as fodder to induce a well-defined reform has
been lost.
The 2003 dividend tax cut provides a second example. Even be-
fore the dividend tax reduction, most corporate income in the United
States was not taxed twice. A substantial share was not taxed at the
corporate level due to shelters, corporate tax subsidies, and other fac-
tors. And half or more of dividends were effectively untaxed at the
individual level because they flow to pension funds, 401(k) plans, and
non-profits. 22° The problem is that the dividend tax cut undermines
the political viability of true corporate tax reform. Any such reform
would have to combine the carrot of addressing the "double taxation"
of dividends with the stick of closing corporate loopholes and prefer-
ential tax provisions, to ensure that corporate income is taxed once
and only once—but at least once. The dividend tax cut instead just
gave the carrot away.
The same problem has occurred in the taxation of capital in-
come generally. Enacting meaningful reform will require conforming
the treatment of capital income and interest deductions. Yet by reduc-
ing the taxation of capital income without also restricting the ability
to deduct interest payments, legislators gave away the easy part of re-
form and now have substantially less to bargain with to make the
treatment of interest income and expense compatible.
220 See generally William G. Gale, About Half of Dividend Payments Do Not Face Double Taxa-
tion, 97 TAX NO•l'ES 839 (2002).
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Broadening the base is always a difficult sell politically, because it
creates losers. It is especially difficult, perhaps impossible, as a stand-
alone policy because President Bush and almost all Republicans in
Congress have signed the "no new taxes" pledge. 221 The signers of the
pledge agree not to vote for base-broadening changes unless they are
coupled explicitly with rate reductions.
CONCLUSION
This Article shows that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts are regressive,
unaffordable, and poorly designed to boost economic growth in either
the short run or the long run. Potential justifications for the tax cuts—
including the feared possibility of paying off the public debt (the
"peril of zero debt" that apparently worried Federal Reserve Chairman
Alan Greenspan in 2001), the potential restraint imposed on govern-
ment spending by the tax cuts (the "starve the beast" hypothesis), and
the notion that the tax cuts represent a piece-meal approach to tax
reform—have all been shown to be unwarranted or misleading.
Over the next few years, policymakers will have the opportunity to
revisit the existence and structure of the tax cuts in the debate over
removing their sunsets. The current focal point of that debate is
whether extending the tax cuts must be offset, within the congres-
sional budget rules, by other spending or revenue changes. As this Ar-
ticle emphasizes, in the long run, there is no alternative to doing so.
And the spending and tax changes required to finance the tax cuts, as
this Article presents, appear to be well beyond the realm of political
feasibility, underscoring just how unaffordable the tax cuts are.
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Table 2: Effect of the AMT on the Bush Administration's Tax Cu&
Cash Income Class
(Thousands of 2003$)
Percent of Tax Units with No
Cut Due to AMT
Percent of Cut Taken Back
by AMT
2006 2009 2014 2006 2009 2014
All 0.7 1.4 4.1 15.8 23.4 36.0
0-10 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1
10-20 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
20-30 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1
30-40 0.0 0.1 0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.8
40-50 0.2 0.3 1.2 -0.1 0.3 2.6
50-75 0.6 1.1 3.7 0.3 2.3 11.4
75-100 0.8 2,1 6.0 7.9 18,1 39.3
100-200 2.2 4,5 12.8 25.9 40.0 64.3
200-500 4.2 7.3 12.7 49.2 59.2 68.9
500-1000 1.1 1.1 1.5 14.2 16.9 20.7
More than 1000 0.6 1.2 1.1 4.9 5.8 7.0
Source: Tax Policy Center Micro simu ation Model
I
 Baseline pre-EGTRRA law. Tax cuts include those currently in place and those the



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Revenue Loss in 2014(in $ Billions) 400
Required Percentage Change in All
Non-Interest Outlay& -12 3278
Discretionary Spending -35 1149
Defense, HS, International -61 651
Other -80 998
Mandatory Spending -19 2129
Social Security -48 827
Medicare -57 698
Medicaid -114 348
All Three -21 1873
Other -155 256





Payroll Tax -34 1173
Corporate Tax -124 320
I Authors' calculations. See Table 3.
2 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, DIE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS
2005 To 2014, at 3 tb1.1-2 (2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/
49xx/doc4985/01-26-BudgetOudook-EntireReport.pdf (last modified Apr. 6,
2004).
3
 Percent cuts which exceed 100 are arithmetic artifacts. No program can be
cut more than 100%.
Table 5: Long-Term Cost of the Tax Cuts 	 •
r
Through 2080 Infinite Horizon
Tax cuts
As % of GDP 2.2 2.2
In present-value dollars 111 $18
Social Security
As % of GDP 0.7 1.2
In present-value dollars $3.7 $10.4
Source: Authors' calculations and BD. OF TRS., FED. OLD AGE & SURVIVORS
INS. & DISABILITY INS. TRUST FUNDS, THE 2003 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
BOARD OF TRUS'T'EES OF TILE FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE
AND DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS 59 tbl.IV.B7 (2003), available al
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Table 9: Long-Term Effects of a 10 Percent Cut in Income Tax Rates 	 '
(Percentage Change in GDP and GNP)
Financed by:
Model Cuts in Spending Increase in Income Tax
GDP GNP GDP GNP
OLG — Closed* -0.1 -0.1 -1.5 -1.5
OLG — Open 0.5 -0.4 0.2 -2.1
Ramsey* 0.8 0.8 -1.2 -1.2
Source: Roam' DENNIS IF.T AL., MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF A 10 PERCENT CUT IN
INCOME TAX RATES 17 tbl.A-2 (Cong. Budget Office, Technical Paper No. 2004-07, 2004),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/54xx/doc5485/2004-07.pdf (last modified May
27, 2004) and conversation with David Weiner.
* GNP and GDP are the same in these models.
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